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Pakistan's Future: Is Past Prologue?

This chapter identifies several impediments to a stable, secure Pakistan and discusses how each of these may develop over the coming ten-year time horizon. Admittedly, other outcomes are possible; however, the outcome explored in this volume is perhaps the optimal one. The first section of this chapter details the problematic history of constitutionalism in Pakistan. The second section addresses a particularly important derivative problem of the failure of Pakistan's elites to agree on a constitutional framework: the imbalance in power between civilians and the military, especially the army's extensive role in making political decisions. The third section explores in some detail key nuclear challenges emanating from the state. Namely, what is the future potential willingness of governments to provide nuclear technology and how likely is it that the state's nuclear security will be breached by nonstate actors. That section also discusses the role of the army and intelligence services in promoting subconventional conflicts in Pakistan's neighbors. The fourth section describes key political parties and their likely future evolution. The fifth section addresses Pakistan's myriad internal security challenges. The sixth, seventh, and eighth sections detail demographic trends, Pakistan's economic prospects, and social development progress, respectively. The chapter concludes with a discussion of social and economic trends and where Pakistanis are likely to be in 2015 in terms of incomes and living conditions.

Failed Constitutionalism and Governance

Nations need an agreed-upon set of rules by which political decisions are made and power transferred if they are to prosper. This may be a popularly agreed-upon constitution or similar compact binding the government and the governed. Without such a compact, groups constantly jockey for power. Transfers of power are chaotic and often violent. Decisions go unmade or are made and then retracted.

Pakistan has repeatedly failed to promulgate an enduring constitution: It has had *five* constitutions since independence in 1947. Its most recent constitution, that of 1973, has been significantly altered in form and substance. Nonetheless, the 1973 constitution in its idealized form remains the lodestone of political legitimacy. Unfortunately, within the coming decade, it is unlikely that Pakistan's political, military, and bureaucratic elites will be able to agree upon and sustain a working parliamentary democracy as set down in the 1973 constitution. This is likely to be true whether Pakistan reverts to a military government or remains under the nominal control of civilians. The armed forces have long favored a presidential system and military leaders have frequently suspended the constitution, followed by an imposition of a president-dominated system. After long periods of military governance, civilians find it difficult (or even undesirable) to reverse these policies to diminish the power of the president and restore a truly parliamentary system.

The past and likely future failure to create a constitutional democracy stems from fundamental disagreements among Pakistan's military, its civilian leaders, and civil society—a category that includes Islamists. Since 1947, these groups have contested whether Pakistan should be a presidential or parliamentary system, where the balance of civil-military power should reside; the appropriate role for Islam in the state; the balance between federal and local power; and whether and how the state should incorporate areas such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).¹ The failure of constitutionalism in Pakistan is

¹ Paula R. Newberg, *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995; and Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan*, Karachi/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

deeply problematic because many of Pakistan's internal and even external security challenges stem from the state's failure to establish a constitutional order that is honored.

Central Governance in Dispute

Even though Pakistan has been governed directly by the military for more than half of its existence and indirectly for the remainder, according to opinion polls most Pakistanis still prefer democratic government. The demands for democracy become most pronounced after periods when Pakistanis have experienced several years of military rule. The missteps of military governments evoke a clamor for democracy, which recedes after invariably flawed civilian governments come to power.² Ironically, military leaders and their supporters within the ranks and beyond espouse democracy as an ideal state, even though they have often contended that Pakistanis are not ready for it owing to Pakistan's lack of development, pervasive illiteracy, and dysfunctional political institutions. All military rulers have chosen to maintain a gloss of democracy to provide greater legitimacy. When Gen. Pervez Musharraf seized power in 1999, he did not declare martial law, in contrast to his predecessors, General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq. He insisted on being referred to as "President" rather than "General."³

Civilian elites have ostensibly preferred parliamentary democracy, and military elites have preferred a presidential system. Pakistan has oscillated between some variety of one or the other form since independence in 1947.⁴ All military rulers have imposed presidential systems.

² C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull, *Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S.*, Washington, D.C.: Program on International Policy Attitudes, United States Institute of Peace, Working Paper, A Joint Study of World-publicopinion.org and the United States Institute of Peace, February 2008. For figures demonstrating Pakistani fears about the 2008 elections and their nonmilitary preferences, see International Republican Institute (IRI), *IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, January 19–29, 2008*, 2008a.

³ However, at the end of his tenure as Chief of Army Staff in November 2007, he declared emergency rule, an extra-constitutional action and tantamount to martial law.

⁴ Herbert Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan*, Karachi/New York: Oxford University Press, 1956; Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley, Calif.: University of

After the restoration of civilian governance, the political parties have had difficulty restoring the powers of the prime minister at least in part because the parties have been weakened during the military's tenure.⁵ Since coming to power in February 2008, the current civilian government has not shown any interest in diminishing presidential powers at least in part because Pakistan's civilian president, Asif Zardari, enjoys those powers.⁶

Pakistanis widely accept as legitimate the constitution of 1973, forged under Zulfikar Bhutto. That constitution mandated a parliamentary system with the prime minister as the head of government and a president with limited powers. It also called for a bicameral legislature with an indirectly elected senate and a directly elected national assembly. The latter became the more powerful of the two bodies. That constitution and the parliamentary system it laid out have functioned for fewer than seven years since 1973.⁷ Despite the restoration of democracy in February 2008, the new civilian leadership has yet to restore many of the checks and balances and freedoms stipulated in the original constitution, but that were undermined under Musharraf.

Changes to the constitution that undermined Pakistan's democracy included amendments by General Zia, who came to power in a

California Press, 1961; Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and Robert C. Oberst, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, 5th ed., Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 2002.

⁵ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Karachi/New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

⁶ In Pakistan, the constitutional amendment that concentrates power in the hands of the president is known as "Article 58(2)." Also known as the Eighth Amendment, it empowers the president to dissolve the government and the parliament ("Constitution [Eighth Amendment] Act, 1985: An Act Further to Amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," *Gazette of Pakistan*, Extraordinary, November 11, 1985). It was introduced during General Zia's tenure.

⁷ It functioned for about four years under Bhutto before Zia declared martial law and suspended the constitution. He imposed a presidential system by amending the constitution. Despite the restoration of democracy, that amendment was not reversed until 1997 under Nawaz Sharif. Again Musharraf imposed a presidential system in 1999. The foregoing suggests that strictly speaking, Pakistan's parliamentary system has functioned for between six and seven years since 1973.

coup in 1977, that increased the power of the president to both appoint and dismiss the prime minister and to dissolve the national assembly, although not the senate. The president was also granted the right to appoint ministers and provincial governors. General Zia also introduced an Islamization program to bring Pakistan's laws into conformity with Islam. Subsequent civilian governments, including the current civilian one, have not succeeded in permanently and comprehensively overturning many of these changes.⁸ Musharraf further reduced the powers of the National Assembly by creating a National Security Council, dominated by the military and aimed at ensuring the military a permanent role in government decisionmaking.⁹ By the time Musharraf stepped down as army chief, he had introduced many amendments to the constitution that reordered the centers of state power. Despite the elections in February 2008 and return to nominal civilian governance, Musharraf's amendments to the constitution remain intact as of this writing.

The Center's Relations with the Provinces and Other Areas

Disputes over the devolution of authority to the provinces, as in Baluchistan, and the constitutional status of key areas, such as FATA, will remain major political issues with important implications for Pakistan's internal stability. Despite commitments by past governments to devolve more power to Baluchistan (and other provinces) and to reconsider the constitutional status of FATA, few believe that the central government will be willing to fulfill these commitments. First, Pakistani governments, especially military ones, prefer the status quo, particularly for FATA, which has long been a base from which militant groups, working on behalf of the military and intelligence agencies, can be cultivated and launched. Second, all parties realize that

⁸ General Zia introduced Federal Sharia Court in 1979, which has since reviewed hundreds of "shariat positions" challenging laws on the basis of Islam and has completed a comprehensive review of Pakistan's laws for "repugnancy" to Islam. He also created the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, which considers appeals from the Federal Sharia Court. See Hamid Khan, 2001. See especially Chapters 26–29 on General Zia's various initiatives and their import, pp. 509–553, and "General Elections, March 1977," pp. 627–680.

⁹ See text of "Legal Framework Order, 2002: Chief Executive's Order No. 24 of 2002," *Gazette of Pakistan*, Extraordinary, August 2002.

changing the status quo, especially in FATA, will be extremely difficult and will likely bring about greater insecurity in the near term even if reforms are needed for longer-term stability. Skeptics rightly note that the state has been unable to effectively govern settled areas. How can it do so in FATA, which lacks a police force, courts, and other public services? Third, the state's desire to suppress the price of natural gas, which is an important source of energy for the rest of the country, will limit the state's willingness to devolve authority to Baluchistan, which contains considerable natural gas resources.

The contentious issue of how the center relates to the provinces and territories has been an underlying factor in several provincial ethnic conflicts since 1947. Provinces tend to have a distinct ethnic flavor. FATA and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are overwhelmingly populated by Pashtuns (also called Pakhtuns and Pathans), Punjab by Punjabis, Sindh by Sindhis, Baluchistan by Baluch, and Azad Kashmir by groups who speak variants of Kashmiri. Like most other developing countries, rural dwellers have migrated to the major cities. However, the ethnic character of the provinces persists with important exceptions. Sindh's urban areas are also populated by Mohajirs (Muslim speakers of Urdu who came from northern states of India such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh after the partition) and Pashtuns. Karachi is now home to more Pashtuns than any other city in Pakistan.¹⁰ Quetta is home to many Punjabis and Pashtuns. Baluchistan harbors pockets of Pashtuns who have lived there for centuries. The Punjab, as the seat of government and agriculture, attracts people from across the country.

As a result of the ethnic composition of the provinces, central-provincial issues have a tendency to develop an ethnic character, with disgruntled ethnic groups accusing the center of "Punjabi chauvinism." Complaints about the dominance of Punjab have centered on such issues as unfair access to government jobs, unfair distribution of

¹⁰ According to the most recent 1998 census, Karachi's population numbered approximately ten million. That census suggests the following breakdown by mother tongue, which correlates with ethnicity: Urdu, 48.52 percent; Punjabi, 13.94 percent; Pashto, 11.42 percent; Sindhi, 7.22 percent; Baluch, 4.34 percent; Seraiki, 2.11 percent; and others, 12.4 percent. See findpk.com, *Visit Pakistan*, "Urban Centers/Maps of Pakistan: Karachi," not dated.

resources, and inequitable policies. The central government has also been accused of spending proportionately more on Punjab.¹¹

Ethnocentrism is a problem. Pakistan lost Bangladesh in its 1971 civil war in part because West Pakistanis viewed Bengalis, who are the dominant ethnic group in former East Pakistan, as the “lesser Pakistanis.” West Pakistan deprived East Pakistan of political representation proportional to its population. The 1973 constitution, forged in the wake of the Bangladesh separation, devolves extensive powers to the provinces, including control over natural resources. Successive civilian and military regimes have refused to implement these provisions.¹²

Residents of Baluchistan are deeply upset about the central government's policy of refusing to pay market prices for Baluch natural gas while failing to improve access to electricity and public services for residents of the province. Because of the lack of local economic opportunities, Baluch have migrated to other provinces. The Baluch also are upset that the construction of military cantonments and the Chinese project to construct a deepwater port at Baluchistan's Gwadar Port have not resulted in more local jobs and construction projects. The national government has also failed to build roads within the sprawling province that would connect it to key Pakistani cities. As Pakistan's most sparsely populated province, Baluchistan will never have the representation needed in the national assembly to get a bigger share of the pie, and its grievances are apt to endure.¹³ A number of Baluch militant groups have sought to achieve by force what they have not been able to achieve through the political system.

The current problems in FATA are another manifestation of Pakistan's constitutional failures, failures that are unlikely to go away over the course of the next ten years. FATA are governed by a colonial-era

¹¹ For a recent discussion of Pakistan's internal frictions, see Selig Harrison, *Pakistan: State of the Union*, Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, 2009.

¹² See Craig Baxter, “Constitution Making: The Development of Federalism in Pakistan,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 12, December 1974, pp. 1074–1085.

¹³ See Harrison, 2009; International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Baluchistan*, Islamabad/Brussels, Asia Briefing No. 69, October 22, 2007b; and Frédéric Grare, *Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Paper No. 65, January 2006.

legal regime, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). FCR enshrines several principles—such as collective punishment—that have been ruled unconstitutional by Pakistan’s high courts to no avail. While FCR shields FATA residents from the responsibilities of Pakistani citizenship (e.g., paying taxes), it also deprives them of protections such as due process and separation of police, judicial, and executive authority.

Rather than extending Pakistan’s legal system to FATA, the government has exercised presidential authority through the governor of NWFP, acting through political agents, tribal consultative bodies (jirgas), tribal elders (maliks), and tribal militias (lashkars). The political agent of the seven FATA agencies acts as judge, juror, and prosecutor, with no appellate mechanisms for those who seek redress. The Frontier Corps (FC)—a poorly trained, poorly equipped paramilitary organization composed largely of local Pashtuns and officers from the Pakistan Army—is formally responsible for law and order in FATA. Since independence, no government has acted to change the separate and unequal status in FATA. There are few prospects that the FATA legal status will be changed, despite recent proclamations by the new government to do so.¹⁴ This hesitancy to contend with FATA is arguably due to the fact that Pakistan’s security establishment has benefited from using FATA as a buffer zone on the Afghan border, free from public scrutiny, from which it can stage secretive operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere.¹⁵

Successive government decisions to leave FCR intact rather than to extend the constitution to FATA have resulted in little formal representation by citizens of FATA in the national assembly and no provincial representation. With minimal government representation from

¹⁴ See Nasir Iqbal, “Panel Formed to Review FCR,” *Dawn*, April 25, 2008. For a comprehensive account of numerous FATA-related issues, see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, eds., *Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses*, Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2005.

¹⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*, New York: Viking, 2008a.

FATA, Islamabad has come under little domestic pressure to develop the area and extend the formal writ of law to it.¹⁶

Exacerbating these center-provincial concerns, all of Pakistan's military leaders (Ayub, Zia, and Musharraf) have introduced similar versions of purported "local governance" regimes. These schemes resulted in a greater concentration of power at the center by devolving resources and authority from the provinces to the districts, while failing to decentralize resources from the center to the provinces.¹⁷ These "local government" schemes have generally allowed the central government to provide resources directly to the district level, bypassing the provincial government.¹⁸ Through these local government schemes, military governments developed their own patronage networks, displacing those of civilian political parties. The military governments hoped to use the districts to strip political parties of their local power bases. These plans resulted in a greater concentration of power at the center, a diminished role for provincial governments, and the erosion of politics at the district level, while producing little in the way of local government control. Civilians tend to undo military-promulgated local government regimes once they regain power in an effort to reverse the harm these regimes pose to their personal or party interests.

The concept of local government has enjoyed little legitimacy among the different stakeholders in the state and polity alike because of its strong association with autocratic military governments.¹⁹ How-

¹⁶ Prior to 1996, when adult franchise was introduced, maliks served as the Electoral College, which elected representatives from each of the seven agencies. In 1996, the adult franchise was extended to FATA. However, the government did not extend the Political Parties Act, which permits political parties to organize. Islamist parties had access to the mosques and madaris (which is the plural of madrassah). In 1997, for the first time, residents of the agencies elected mostly ulema to the national assembly. See the discussion in C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006.

¹⁷ See Hamid Khan, 2001, pp. 884–889. Also see Ali Cheema, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Adnan Qadir, "Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes," in Pranab K. Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee, eds., *Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006.

¹⁸ Districts are a third tier of governance, falling beneath the province.

¹⁹ See Hamid Khan, 2001, pp. 884–889. Also see Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir, 2006.

ever, there is some evidence that Pakistani citizens appreciated aspects of Musharraf's local government measures, even if the political classes did not. The civilian political elites may have some difficulty reversing the devolution under Musharraf. It is too early to determine whether Musharraf's local government scheme will be demolished or preserved, perhaps with some modification such as making local government elections party based. Even if the regime is retained, it may not contribute to meaningful local government. Local officials often lack the training to manage government operations well. However, some form of properly designed local government would improve the quality of public services in Pakistan and, over time, develop better political parties.

The Army: Guarantor of an Insecure State?

One of the most enduring and recalcitrant impediments to the creation of a democratic political system in Pakistan is the dominance of the army and the inability of civilian institutions to control it. Many observers, within and outside of Pakistan, expect the army will return to power within the decade. After eight years of military rule and Musharraf's deliberate efforts to weaken the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N), the parties have been diminished and show little capacity to govern effectively. Politicians are wary of antagonizing the military and cautious in exerting control over it despite the fact that the military is the weakest it has been perhaps since 1971, when it lost Bangladesh. Worse, the political parties seem to prefer the military to be in power rather than as a rival and actively use the military to undermine political competition. The zero-sum attitude of the political class diminishes the likelihood of any united civilian front against military dominance of the state. Many analysts of Pakistan expect that the army, which stepped down in fall 2007, may well return when public opinion again turns against the inept civilian leadership. Even though the military's record is poor, civilians have historically welcomed military intervention after periods of civilian ineptitude, legitimizing military rule.

Pakistan has been governed by the army for more than half of its 61 years. It has had four military leaders since independence in 1947: Ayub Khan (1958–1969); Yayha Khan (1969–1971); Zia-ul-Haq (1978–1988); and Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008). When the military has been out of power, it has played a prominent role in government by pressuring the political parties, undermining popularly elected governments by manipulating party rifts, and even creating new political parties (e.g., Pakistan Muslim-League-Quaid-e-Azim [PML-Q] and PML-N) to act as their political proxies, which the army (with assistance from the intelligence and police agencies) then helps to prevail at the polls.

The army's dominance is due to historical reasons. Pakistan came into being as an insecure state, with a territorial dispute over Kashmir and a contested border with Afghanistan. Many Pakistanis harbor a deep, persistent belief that India does not accept Pakistan as a separate state and seeks to reabsorb it. This view is an article of faith among the polity and military alike. (The establishment actively nurtures this perception through curricula in Pakistani schools and management of the public discourse about its neighbor.)²⁰ In light of Pakistan's revisionist agenda, the absence of a rigorous national security debate, and civilian leaders capable of restraining the army, the army has pursued a variety of reckless policies at home and abroad. While the army and civilian elites alike often refer to the threat India poses to Pakistan, Pakistan has initiated every war it has fought with India with the exception of the 1971 war.²¹ These policies have both sustained the Indo-Pakistan security competition and confirmed the reality of the Indian threat

²⁰ See Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005; Khurshid Kamal Aziz, *The Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan*, Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1993; A. H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim, *The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan—Urdu, English, Social Studies and Civics*, Islamabad, Pakistan: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2003; Iftikhar Ahmed, "Islam, Democracy and Citizenship Education: An Examination of the Social Studies Curriculum in Pakistan," *Current Issues in Comparative Education*, Vol. 7, No. 1, December 15, 2004.

²¹ In that war, India intervened because Pakistan's attacks on Bengalis drove them into Indian territory, which precipitated a humanitarian crisis.

among Pakistanis, who are often ignorant of their army's activities, including its culpability in commencing hostilities, sponsoring insurgents, and failing to achieve victory in its varied efforts.²²

While India has been and will remain an important strategic opponent for Pakistan, Pakistan's insecurity is not restricted to its eastern border. When Pakistan became independent, Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's entry into the United Nations and refused to accept the internationally designated border between the two states, claiming parts of Pakistan that were inhabited by Pashtuns.

Pakistan has long sought to cultivate influence in Afghanistan and deny India the same. Pakistan largely succeeded in doing so until 2001 by supporting the Taliban, which confined India's influence to the Panjshir Valley where India—along with Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, and others—assisted the Northern Alliance. Pakistan's relations with Iran have been turbulent for decades owing to Iran's support of militarized Shia elements in Pakistan in the 1980s and Pakistan's past and ongoing support of militant Sunni elements operating within and beyond Pakistan.

These historical factors explain in part why the army sees itself, and is seen by many Pakistanis, as the guarantor of Pakistan's security in an insecure region. Pakistan's civilian institutions have been unable to restrain the army because of their own weaknesses and because they ultimately embrace or at least tacitly accept this narrative. (As described below, the political elites also benefit in key ways from the army's role in politics.) During the army's various tenures, it has expanded its control over business assets; cultivated and co-opted bureaucratic, industrial, and political elites; diminished opposition to the concept of military intervention by accumulating ever-more stakeholders; and signed lucrative strategic partnerships with the United States. Washington, through its patronage of the army and lucrative supply relationship, has

²² Most Pakistanis did not and do not believe that their country began the wars in 1947 and 1965 or that their country killed Bengalis in the 1971 war. Pakistani media incorrectly characterized the Pakistanis as winning, and many Pakistanis believed they had won the conflicts until the varied terms of the armistices revealed otherwise. See discussions in Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, Karachi/New York: Oxford University Press, 2008b.

done much to bolster the army's status and position within Pakistan. U.S. willingness to support military dictators while claiming to support democracy has antagonized Pakistanis. U.S. continued support of President Musharraf was an important precipitant of anti-U.S. sentiment.²³ With each round of failed military government, the civilian political system has found it more difficult to govern once the army leaves. The current civilian government is encountering these same problems.

In light of the major role the army plays politically and economically in Pakistan and the concomitant retarded development of the civilian institutions that could otherwise control the military, the army is unlikely to disengage from politics permanently. It is likely to return to power over the course of the next ten years. Even if the army were to decide—for its own institutional reasons—that continued political intervention corrodes morale, discipline, and professionalism; without a simultaneous increase in the civilians' political will and capacity to govern, future detachments from politics are likely to be transient.

The Army's Preeminent Role in Decisionmaking

The army's willingness to intervene politically and economically stems from its enduring belief that it is the preeminent guardian of Pakistan's foreign and domestic interests, and also of the "ideology" of Pakistan, variously construed.²⁴ This view is generally shared by the citizenry, and it persists despite the polity's cyclical disgruntlement with the missteps taken by military leaders when they directly hold power. This notion that the military (especially the army) is the guarantor of the state stems in great measure from the ways in which the subcontinent

²³ See, among others, Hassan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947–1997*, Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000b; Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, London: Palgrave, 2000a; Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, London: Pluto Press, 2007; Nawaz, 2008b; Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Md.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

²⁴ Yayha Khan portrayed the army as the protector of Pakistan's "ideological frontier," and this role has endured. See Haqqani, 2005. See the chapter "Defending Ideological Frontiers," in particular, pp. 51–86.

was partitioned. Early on, severe disputes emerged with India over rights to water, the distribution of government (including military) assets from the former British India, and territorial disputes, the most famous of which concerns Kashmir.

The army, with its central role in national decisionmaking and its desire to change the status quo with India, has taken many risks that have led the country into repeated conflicts and near conflicts with India.²⁵ The limited incursion in Kargil in 1999 illustrates the consequences of the army's insular decisionmaking. Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry seized territory within India's Kargil Dras sector, masquerading as mujahideen as part of Pakistan's deception and denial campaign. In an effort to preserve operational security, the army *did not* involve the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the other service chiefs, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nor did the army fully explain the nature of the operation and its import to Pakistan's civilian prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. The foreign minister was eventually asked to defend to the international community an aggressive military move that had been hidden from him for as long as possible. The chief of the Air Staff was called in at the last minute to devise plans to counter Indian air assaults even though his service had not been privy to the incursion.²⁶ On July 4, 1999, Prime Minister Sharif solicited the assistance of U.S. President Bill Clinton as India intensified its military response. President Clinton insisted that Pakistan respect the sanctity of the "Line of Control." While the army was forced to vacate the seized territory, the army believed that Kargil was a tactical success undermined by weak politicians. The army's failure to learn the lessons of past incur-

²⁵ See Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1995, pp. 79–114; Chris Gagné, "Conflict Prevention and Risk Reduction: Lessons from the 1990 Crisis," in Michael Krepon, Chris Gagné, and Henry L. Stimson Center, eds., *Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia*, New Delhi: Vision Books, 2003; Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, "India and Pakistan at the Edge," *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3, January 2002, pp. 69–86.

²⁶ C. Christine Fair, "Militants in the Kargil Conflict: Myths, Realities, and Impacts," in Peter Lavoy, ed., *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of Kargil*, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 231–256.

sions suggests that Kargil-like episodes may well be repeated should the army decide that doing so would advance its interests.²⁷

Regional Security and Risk Taking

Kargil represents an extreme extension of the Pakistan Army's propensity to take "calculated risks," where the likelihood of success is low. Pakistan's calculated risks have almost always relied upon proxy elements (or security forces pretending to be militants) to prosecute unconventional conflicts. Pakistan has lacked the ability to defeat India in a conventional military confrontation. In a future, longer conflict, India's advantages will likely be overwhelming. The differences in capability are likely to increase over the next decade, cementing Pakistan's status as the inferior military power and making unconventional warfare relatively more attractive. It is important to note that India's conventional dominance is often exaggerated because of unjustified assumptions that higher defense expenditures and more equipment automatically translate into a better force. There are reasons to believe that this may not be the case in the near term. However, Pakistan takes it as an article of faith that India is conventionally dominant.²⁸ In the cases of 1947 and 1965 (over Kashmir), the initial use of proxies resulted in all-out war with India. In 1971, Pakistan also used proxy elements to counter Indian-backed proxies that were aiding the insurgency in East Pakistan.²⁹ In 1999, Pakistan did not use proxy elements;

²⁷ There are multiple interpretations of Kargil. Stephen Cohen, in his review of our book, offered the explanation that Kargil was a tactical defeat but a strategic success in that "it got the Indians talking once again." While conceding the value of this view, we do not espouse this interpretation here. See Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1450-USCA, 2001. For a discussion of the army's failure to integrate the ISI, the other service chiefs, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Fair, 2009.

²⁸ For more nuanced discussions, see Ashley J. Tellis, *Stability in South Asia*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, DB-185-A, 1997; and John H. Gill, "India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?" in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., *Strategic Asia, 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005.

²⁹ While India's backing of the Bengali insurgent force, the Mukti Bahini, is well known, Pakistan use of proxies of its own in that conflict is less well-known. Pakistan's Jamaat-e-

however, the claim that the incursions were made by mujahideen represents the outer limits of Pakistan's proxy strategy. In 1999, Pakistan's strategy again backfired as the conflict gained Pakistan nothing and nearly resulted in a wider war.

Pakistan's army has indulged in such risky behavior when it has decided that it needs to act to secure its interests and when it believes that it can exploit a window of Indian weakness. Pakistan's army has repeatedly decided that action now will be more likely to bring success than if it defers action to a time when the chances of victory will be even slimmer. While prospects for victory are low, the army has believed that taking a risk is better than taking no action. However, to lessen the risk of retaliation or escalation, Pakistan has preferred to operate through proxies in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan or as state actors disguised as nonstate actors, believing that such subterfuge affords it some degree of plausible deniability. Moreover, nuclear weapons have allowed Pakistan to prosecute subconventional conflicts with considerable impunity.³⁰

Despite the rapprochement over Kashmir since 2003, fears about India have driven the Pakistan Army to support a suite of policies that have destabilized the region. In pursuit of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, it has sought to and continues to (unsuccessfully) cultivate that state as an area of Pakistani influence. Pakistan openly supported various mujahideen groups in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1994 and the Taliban from 1994 until 2001.³¹ Pakistan is also accused of continuing to support groups within the Afghan Taliban, such as Jalaluddin

Islami (JI), which opposed Bengali independence, organized a number of militant groups (e.g., al-Badr, al-Shams, and Razakars), which were armed by the army and which were used to combat the Mukti Bahini. These Pakistan-backed Jamaat militant groups are widely held responsible for mass murder, rape, and pillaging in East Pakistan. See Ishtiaq Hossain and Noore Alam Siddiquee, "Islam in Bangladesh Politics: The Role of Ghulam Azam of Jamaat-I-Islami," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 384–399.

³⁰ See Tellis, Fair, and Medby, 2001; Fair, 2009.

³¹ See the discussion in C. Christine Fair, "Pakistan's Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2008. Also see Pamela Constable, "Attacks on U.S. Drive Pakistan to a Crossroads: Musharraf's Decision to Back West Holds Political Risk, Opportunity," *Washington Post*, October 8, 2001, p. A15.

Haqqani, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and the “Quetta Shura,” in spite of its security partnership with the United States to combat terrorist groups.³²

Pakistan's perceptions of an adverse security environment have worsened since 9/11. These perceptions should be a key concern for U.S. policymakers because they increase the probability of conflict in South Asia. Musharraf entered into an alliance with the United States for three reasons. One, he sought to protect Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Two, he sought U.S. intervention to resolve the Kashmir issue with some acknowledgment of Pakistan's interests. Three, he wanted to preempt Indian overtures to forge better ties with the United States to counter Pakistan.³³ Pakistan has not just failed to achieve these goals; from its point of view, its position has been significantly undermined. The U.S.-Indian nuclear deal and the impossibility of a comparable deal with Pakistan together are perhaps one reason—but not the only reason—for Pakistan's determination to expand its arsenal as fast as possible.³⁴ Similarly, U.S.-Indian relations have become broad based and strategic. While the United States has quietly encouraged both countries to resolve the Kashmir issue, the most probable solution means ratifying some version of the status quo, a position that Pakistan has not yet embraced.³⁵

The U.S.-led Afghan war has created many challenges for Pakistan. Some elements within the Pakistan Army believed that Pakistan should have changed course on the Taliban even before 9/11. The Taliban offered few advantages and imposed heavy costs on Pakistan. Nonetheless, the Taliban did curtail Indian influence in Afghanistan. In post-9/11 Afghanistan, India has become Afghanistan's most important regional ally. It has opened or reopened several consulates in border provinces; secured sensitive contracts to build the Ring Road,

³² Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan's Dangerous Game,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 15–32.

³³ Within days of 9/11, India offered to let the United States use its air bases to attack Afghanistan. See Fair, 2004a.

³⁴ Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and the Bomb,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 30, 2009.

³⁵ Fair, 2004a.

which connects Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar; and has deployed the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Police Force to provide security for Indian personnel in the country. India currently enjoys—as it has tended to do historically—much closer relations with Kabul than does Islamabad.³⁶

Since 2003, Pakistan has complained to India about its “excessive” consular presence. It has accused India of exploiting its access in Afghanistan to support militants in Baluchistan, tribal areas, and attacks within the Pakistani heartland. India and Afghanistan have blamed Pakistan’s ISI and Pakistan-backed militant groups for attacks on Indian and Afghan targets within Afghanistan, including the dramatic July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul and assassination attempts against Afghan President Hamid Karzai.³⁷

Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has emerged as an important theater for Indo-Pakistani security competition. Fears of Indian encirclement are not limited to Delhi’s presence in Afghanistan. India’s relations with Iran, rapprochement with China, and access to Central Asian states (including two bases in Tajikistan), animate Pakistan’s concerns that it is being surrounded by hostile states or states friendly to India.³⁸

In light of these developments in Pakistan’s neighborhood and Pakistan’s past approaches to contending with its perceived threats, Pakistan is taking steps to manage these risks. Pakistan’s tribal areas are a known sanctuary where Taliban, al Qaeda, and a raft of other militant groups enjoy domicile, health care, recruitment facilities, and training centers.³⁹ Increasingly, observers believe that Pakistan is

³⁶ See Fair, 2008.

³⁷ Scott Baldauf, “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan,” *Christian Science Monitor*, September 12, 2003; Sudha Ramachandran, “Now It’s War Against India in Afghanistan,” *Asia Times*, July 9, 2008. Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain accused India of training Baluch militants in Afghanistan—see M. H. Ahsan, “RAW Is Training 600 Baluchis in Afghanistan: Mushahid Hussain,” *Boloji.com*, May 14, 2006.

³⁸ See Fair, 2008.

³⁹ Numerous U.S. intelligence and military officials have attested that Pakistan’s tribal areas are used as sanctuaries for these groups. See J. Michael McConnell, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 27, 2008; John D. Negroponte,

providing state support to the Afghan Taliban operating in Afghanistan, while working with the international community to eliminate al Qaeda. Accusations abound that Pakistan's paramilitary FC as well as retired and serving ISI personnel are aiding and abetting the Taliban. Even Musharraf conceded the role of retired ISI personnel in Afghanistan during the August 2007 Peace Jirga in Kabul.⁴⁰

International, Afghan, and Pakistani sources have provided increasing evidence that such Pakistan-based militants as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM) are operating against international and Afghan forces in Nuristan and Kunar, among other Afghan provinces.⁴¹ Ahmed Rashid alleges that President Musharraf himself was not only aware of these pro-Taliban activities but ordered them. Rashid argues that early U.S. decisions to use a small footprint, to rely upon "warlords" distrusted by Pakistan to provide security, and to demur from "state building" telegraphed to Islamabad that Washington was not serious about bringing stability to Afghanistan. Driven by the imperatives of geography, Pakistan's leadership determined that it was in its best interest to continue supporting the Taliban.⁴² This calculation has yet to change. A key challenge for U.S. policymakers will be to convince Pakistan's new civilian and military leadership that intervening in Afghanistan is not in Pakistan's strategic interests or will be to put in place policies that make Pakistan's adventurism more costly. Currently, there are few signs that Pakistan's assessment and strategy will change over the course of the next several years.

Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 11, 2007.

⁴⁰ Taimoor Shah and Carlotta Gall, "Afghan Rebels Find a Haven in Pakistan, Musharraf Says," *New York Times*, August 12, 2007.

⁴¹ This information is based on author fieldwork in Afghanistan between June and October 2007; also, see Kathy Gannon, "Pakistan Militants Focus on Afghanistan: Jihadist Groups Are Increasingly Attacking U.S., NATO Forces in Afghanistan," *Associated Press*, July 14, 2008.

⁴² Rashid, 2008a.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Sources of Security and Insecurity

While Pakistan values nuclear weapons because they deter India, the international community views them as threats to regional and international security. There is little that Pakistan can do over the next ten years that would seriously dampen concerns about its program, especially because Pakistan has been heavily involved in nuclear proliferation. There are few signs that the Pakistani government has made it impossible to renew these activities.⁴³ Pakistani government employees have transferred nuclear technology to other states. Insiders within the military or nuclear scientific community *could* pass technologies to state or nonstate actors in breach of Pakistan's security measures. (There are few long-time Pakistan analysts who believe that this is likely, however, given the importance that Pakistan ascribes to its arsenal.) Alternatively, some analysts posit that outsiders could circumvent Pakistan's command-and-control arrangements to obtain nuclear materials or devices. However, this scenario is even less credible than the former.⁴⁴ Whether or not fears of nuclear proliferation are justified, nuclear security will remain a concern as a result of the evolving nature of the proliferation threat, the continued interest of state and nonstate actors in acquiring these weapons, and regional conflicts that may lead to yet another Indo-Pakistan military crisis, with predictable concerns about escalation to nuclear use.⁴⁵

⁴³ Of course, Pakistan, like every other nuclear weapons state, can only implement programs to manage existing risks. It is unlikely that Pakistan—or any other country—can prevent renewed proliferation activities.

⁴⁴ For a solid discussion of real and imagined threats to nuclear security, see Stephen P. Cohen, Statement Before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security Hearing on Addressing the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relationship, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2008.

⁴⁵ For an example by a well-placed official in the Obama transition team of posited scenarios of Pakistan becoming a jihadist state and inheriting the arsenal, see Riedel, 2009.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons

On May 11, 1998, India tested five nuclear devices. After much deliberation and after failed international intervention, on May 28, 1998, Pakistan tested six devices to signal nuclear parity. Despite these claims of nuclear one-upmanship, analysts have questioned the veracity of Indian and Pakistani claims about the numbers and kinds of devices tested, as well as about the purported yields announced.⁴⁶ However, while the details of the tests are still debated, Pakistan and India are now indisputably overt nuclear weapons states, and they have continued to develop their nuclear weapons programs. Possession of nuclear weapons has permanently altered their standing as military powers. Within Pakistan, the program enjoys widespread support among the public as well as within the security establishment. The weapons are viewed as a guarantee of Pakistan's survival as a state and as instruments to advance Pakistan's standing internationally as a nuclear-weapons state.⁴⁷ Reliable command and control and safety arrangements are key components of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. The control and organization of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure falls under the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), a joint-staff organization dominated by the army. Pakistan has implemented a series of measures to ensure the safety of its nuclear arsenal. These measures are designed both to reassure external audiences and to ensure that the army retains control over the arsenal.

⁴⁶ Robert S. Norris, "India and Pakistan, at the Crossroads," paper presented at the Sixth ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, October 29–November 1, 1998, Shanghai, China; T. C. Wallace, "The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests," *Seismological Research Letters*, Vol. 69, 1998, pp. 386–393; Dan M. Davis and Lynn R. Sykes, "Geologic Constraints on Clandestine Nuclear Testing in South Asia," in *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, Vol. 96, No. 20, September 28, 1999, pp. 11,090–11,095.

⁴⁷ A. Q. Khan, the "father" of the Pakistan nuclear bomb, is seen as a national hero. In a June 2008 national poll of Pakistanis, 67 percent said that they would support Khan for president. See IRI, *IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, June 1–15, 2008*, 2008c.

The Proliferation Challenges

In the minds of many analysts and policymakers, A. Q. Khan's proliferation network underscores the potential threat that Pakistan poses. (It is important to note that Khan was not a weaponeer per se; however, he had access to plans and enrichment technology.) A. Q. Khan's global proliferation network is known to have supplied Iran, Libya, and North Korea with expertise and technology to assist in their nuclear programs.⁴⁸ This included centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment, a key technological barrier in developing nuclear weapons. Computer files containing design blueprints for compact nuclear weapons were uncovered in the possession of three Swiss associated with Khan's smuggling network.⁴⁹ Khan's proliferation activities reversed the very network Pakistan used to develop its nuclear weapons: Rather than receiving illicit assistance to develop nuclear weapons, Pakistan provided it.

The possibility that Khan had the sanction, official or unofficial, of his government to sell nuclear materials and technologies on behalf of the Pakistan state cannot be ruled out. However, the extent to which the Pakistani state and army have been complicit in his actions has not been determined.⁵⁰ Pakistan is keen to close the affair. Khan was arrested by Pakistani authorities in 2004 after details of his activities had been publicly revealed. He received only a light admonishment from Musharraf. Khan had been shielded from more severe punishment by his widespread domestic popularity as the "father" of Pakistan's bomb. International investigations into the reach and extent of his network were hampered when Pakistani authorities blocked the

⁴⁸ For detailed accounts, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment*, London, 2007; Gordon Corera, *Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network*, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

⁴⁹ David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, cited in "The Nuclear Network of A. Q. Khan: A Hero at Home, a Villain Abroad," *Economist*, June 19, 2008.

⁵⁰ Corera, 2006; David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, *America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise*, Hanover, N.H.: Steerforth Press, 2007; Adrian Levy, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*, New York: Walker & Co., 2008. See also Seymour M. Hersh, "The Deal: Why Is Washington Going Easy on Pakistan's Nuclear Black Marketers?" *New Yorker*, March 8, 2004.

United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from interviewing Khan. Publicly, the United States exerted little pressure to reverse this decision, fearful of jeopardizing its agreements with Pakistan to counter terrorism.

Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken the lead in reassuring other countries by introducing measures to tighten export controls. The Strategic Export Controls Division was established in 2005, with legislation prohibiting the export from Pakistan of either nuclear materials or expertise. Reportedly, Pakistani citizens known to have nuclear technological expertise have been told their responsibilities under the law. Customs and border police have been trained in techniques for visually detecting nuclear contraband.⁵¹

Although Pakistan has exported nuclear technologies to other states using nonstate channels, it has not provided nuclear materials or technologies to nonstate actors as end-state users. It is true that Western intelligence agencies determined that in 2000, Sultan Bashirudeen Mahmood, the former chief designer and director of the country's Khoshab Atomic Reactor, and Abdul Majid, a retired Pakistani nuclear scientist, had met with al Qaeda, including allegedly contacting Osama bin Laden directly.⁵² Mahmood had been director of nuclear power at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission until 1999, while Majid had worked on nuclear fuel at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology.⁵³ Mahmood concedes that he met with bin Laden. However, he claims that he did so to garner support for his charity, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (loosely translated as *Islamic Revival*). Fortunately, Mahmood was a bit of a "crackpot," in the words of Ahmed Rashid. He authored treatises on how global energy demand can be met by harnessing the power of Jins ("genies"), the numbers of angels

⁵¹ Don Camp, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, June 12, 2008; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, pp. 115–116.

⁵² Steven Mufson, "U.S. Worries About Pakistan Nuclear Arms: Officials Try to Guard Against Arsenal, Radioactive Material Going to Terrorists," *Washington Post*, November 4, 2001, p. A27; Rashid, 2008a, pp. 120–121.

⁵³ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 107.

that can stand on a pin, and the quantum mechanics of the end of days. More important, he was not a weapons expert.⁵⁴

In addition to these concerns, Pakistan has the fastest growing arsenal in the world, according to Riedel among others.⁵⁵ China, again, has been instrumental to Pakistan. While Pakistan has tried to develop plutonium-based weapons since the 1990s and continues to produce plutonium for weapons, China provided assistance to Pakistan's plutonium program. Pakistan's 40–50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor has been operational since 1998. However, Pakistan is building two more heavy-water reactors that will augment its plutonium production capability. All of this suggests that Pakistan plans to continue increasing its arsenal.⁵⁶

The accumulated weight of these concerns—of Pakistan's past proliferation record and its separate challenges of Islamist militancy—have inspired U.S. fears that militants will obtain access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal or technology and use them against the United States or its allies. This transfer could occur with the assistance of individuals within the nuclear establishment, via a regime that is sympathetic to militant ideologies, or through forcible seizure of nuclear materials or weapons. Such doomsday scenarios are common among Western commentators on Pakistan.⁵⁷ The manner in which these narratives conflate all of the major strands of Western concern over Pakistan—political instability, Islamist militancy, and nuclear weapons—probably explains why these various threats sustain credence.

⁵⁴ Ahmed Rashid charitably refers to Mahmood as a “crackpot.” Rashid, 2008a, p. 121. See also Douglas Frantz with David Rohde, “A Nation Challenged: Biological Terror; 2 Pakistanis Linked to Papers on Anthrax Weapons,” *New York Times*, November 28, 2001.

⁵⁵ Riedel, 2009.

⁵⁶ Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Dunham Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated May 15, 2009.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, “How the West Summoned Up a Nuclear Nightmare in Pakistan,” *Sunday Times* (London), September 2, 2007; Michael O'Hanlon, *Pakistan's Collapse, Our Problem*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, July 2, 2008.

Organization and Security of Pakistan's Nuclear Infrastructure

It is in Pakistan's supreme national interest that its nuclear arsenal remains operational and survivable. Achieving this goal requires well-organized systems and oversight to protect the arsenal from internal and external threats. In light of the A. Q. Khan debacle, the United States has both pressured Pakistan to improve and assisted it in improving the security of its nuclear weapons. The convergence between these rationales—of internal will and of external encouragement—has yielded several measures that have substantially improved Pakistan's nuclear stewardship.⁵⁸

All aspects of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal—size and posture, doctrine for use, and prospects for future expansion—are driven overwhelmingly by the country's security concerns about India. Although the exact size of Pakistan's arsenal is unknown, it is believed to consist of at least 60 nuclear warheads, and possibly as many as 120.⁵⁹ Facilities for the production and support of this capability are dispersed across the country, including the Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta and heavy-water reactors in Khushab. The production of highly enriched uranium is considered to be ongoing.⁶⁰ A desire to seek more and larger-yield nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. It is likely that Pakistan is already reconsidering the nature and size of its program in light of India's progress in forging security relations with the United States, Israel, and China and the ratification of the U.S.-Indian civil-

⁵⁸ Although specific details of the security measures remain classified, experts attest to their cumulative impact as having made Pakistan's nuclear assets "impervious to virtually all threats that might be imagined as materializing in peacetime." See Ashley J. Tellis's testimony, U.S. Congress, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability and the Future of U.S. Policy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 16, 2008a, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Kerr and Nikitin, 2009; Shaun Gregory, *The Security of Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan*, West Yorkshire, UK: Bradford University, Pakistan Security Research Unit, Brief No. 22, November 18, 2007a.

⁶⁰ Kerr and Nikitin, 2009.

ian nuclear deal.⁶¹ Pakistan possesses both air- and land-based nuclear delivery methods, and it maintains a general deterrent stance against India. Maintaining broad parity with India is likely to inform decisions about the future size and state of the Pakistani arsenal.

Command and control has been formalized through the creation of the National Command Authority (NCA) in 2000. NCA is the country's topmost decisionmaking body on issues pertaining to Pakistani nuclear affairs, including nuclear use. Its ten-member body is headed by the country's president and also includes the prime minister and army chief of staff. However, the army-dominated SPD is responsible for oversight of the nuclear weapons program. SPD is currently headed by a retired army lieutenant general. It acts as the secretariat of NCA and has the responsibility for the implementation of policies and measures relating to the nuclear arsenal. These tasks include the physical security of Pakistan's nuclear complex and, after the exposure of A. Q. Khan's network, the prevention of further leaks.⁶² In practice, this means that the relationship between the president who heads NCA, and the army that runs SPD, is the principal basis upon which Pakistan's nuclear policy decisionmaking and management rest.

SPD has implemented a number of improved security measures, including those for the physical security of nuclear sites, based on multi-tiered perimeter defense, and for storing the weapons. During normal operations, missiles are reportedly not mated with the warheads, and the fissile cores are not inserted in the warheads. These components are held in different locations.⁶³ SPD's Technical Directorate is responsible for acquiring technology to improve Pakistan's nuclear security. In this capacity, it has worked with countries, including the United States, to

⁶¹ The U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal essentially recognizes India as a *de jure* nuclear power, provides bilateral mechanisms to provide India with technical and material support to its civilian nuclear program, and commits the United States to work with international partners and organizations to secure Indian access to nuclear fuels and technology for its civilian program.

⁶² On Pakistan's nuclear oversight reforms, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, pp. 107–117.

⁶³ Comments by Ashley Tellis to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, March 18, 2008a, p. 55; Gregory, 2007a.

purchase communications and surveillance technologies. While it is unconfirmed whether Pakistan has received permissive action links—technical controls on the weapons that require code-based access to arm the warhead—senior Pakistani weapons scientists have suggested that this is the case.⁶⁴ The accumulated effects of these developments is that despite the political turbulence in Pakistan, U.S. intelligence states:

[T]he ongoing political transition in Pakistan has not seriously threatened the military's control of the nuclear arsenal, but vulnerabilities exist. The Pakistan Army oversees nuclear programs, including security responsibilities, and we judge that the Army's management of nuclear policy issues—to include physical security—has not been degraded by Pakistan's political crisis.⁶⁵

International Significance of Pakistan's Nuclear Challenges

Although the exact scale and details of U.S. assistance to Pakistan's nuclear security have not been made public, Washington is estimated to have invested between \$50 and \$100 million in programs that are thought to encompass assistance, including setting up export controls, establishing methods to assist in the safe storage and transport of nuclear materials, and permitting technology transfers that allow Islamabad to buy sensors and other technologies from U.S. firms to better equip its nuclear sites.⁶⁶ The wider significance of this assistance has been that for the first time, the United States has effectively acknowledged Pakistan's status as a nuclear power.

Pakistan's nuclear aspirations have been a principal sticking point in its relations with the United States. While the 1976 Glenn and 1977 Symington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 were adopted in response to India's nuclear test in 1974 in an effort to halt

⁶⁴ Andrew Koch and Kristin Rayhack, "Political Fallout: The Threat to Pakistan's Nuclear Stability," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 13, 2007.

⁶⁵ See McConnell, 2008.

⁶⁶ The estimation of \$100 million comes from interviews with Bush administration officials conducted by David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, the authors of "U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, November 18, 2007.

further proliferation, these amendments also affected U.S.-Pakistan relations. The Symington Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits most forms of U.S. assistance to countries that are found to traffic in nuclear enrichment equipment and technology outside of the international safeguards. The Glenn Amendment prohibits U.S. assistance to any nonnuclear weapons state that, among other things, tests a nuclear device.⁶⁷ (In 1979, Pakistan was in violation of the Symington Amendment because it covertly constructed a uranium enrichment plant. Washington aid to Islamabad was possible through the use of presidential waivers.)

At the height of the cooperative U.S.-Pakistani effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community determined that Pakistan's nuclear program was reaching fruition. Technically, the massive U.S. military aid program to Pakistan would have been illegal according to the Symington Amendment. To accommodate the strategic imperatives of providing assistance to Pakistan and the emergent reality that Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability merited sanctions under the Symington Amendment, the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was passed in 1985 with the active involvement of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was keen to find a way around this impasse. The Pressler Amendment made U.S. support conditional on an annual presidential assessment and certification that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons. This presidential certification was granted five years running, allowing the assistance program to continue even while Pakistan continued

⁶⁷ The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes only five nuclear weapons states: the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. India, Pakistan, and Israel are not signatories to the NPT; they acquired nuclear weapons outside of the NPT; and they are not recognized nuclear weapons states. See Robert M. Hathaway, "Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests," *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2000; Barbara Leitch LePoer et al., *India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and U.S. Response*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report 98-570, updated November 24, 1998; and Jeanne J. Grimmett, *Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report 98-486, updated September 19, 2001.

developing its nuclear weapons capability.⁶⁸ Pakistan was not penalized until 1990 when U.S. interest in the region lapsed after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is ironic that most Pakistanis vilify the Pressler Amendment as “targeting” Pakistan when in fact it was designed to permit aid to continue in spite of U.S. knowledge of the advanced state of Pakistan’s weapons program.

Eleven years later, 9/11 motivated the United States to formally abandon its efforts to roll back Pakistan’s nuclear program. By helping to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the United States has through its actions endorsed Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state, although no public declaration has been made. While the U.S. government has been forced to recognize Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state, Pakistan is aware of foreign, including U.S., concerns about the risks Pakistan poses to the international community.

Pakistan is vexed by U.S. efforts to provide India with civilian nuclear assistance both because the deal recognizes India as a responsible nuclear power (a claim Pakistan rejects) and because it reflects the significance of the U.S.-Indian relationship. Pakistani government officials believe, with justification, that India is more culpable than Pakistan in bringing nuclear weapons to the subcontinent. They contend that Pakistan had little choice but to develop a nuclear capability once India began pursuing these weapons. Pakistanis rarely—if ever—acknowledge that most of the American and global nonproliferation legal structures were developed in response to India’s test in 1974. Rather, they argue that India suffered few consequences for developing nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has been unfairly punished for doing the same. Pakistanis frequently point to the U.S. decision to cut off all military aid in 1990 when President George H.W. Bush declined to certify that Pakistan had not crossed critical nuclear redlines under the Pressler Amendment.

⁶⁸ For a discussion of Pakistan’s collusion in the initial formulation of the Pressler Amendment: Husain Haqqani, speaking at the Heritage Foundation (Marvin Weinbaum, James McCormick, Husain Haqqani, and Lisa Curtis, “Pakistan Crisis and U.S. Policy Options,” Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, lecture hosted by Walter Lohman, November 27, 2007).

Pakistani officials regularly opine that the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal will enable India to advance its nuclear program. They argue that poorer Pakistan will have difficulty matching this effort without military assistance from its partners. The average Pakistani does not understand why India should be given preferential treatment, especially in light of Pakistan's losses in the war on terror. Pakistanis tend not to believe A. Q. Khan ran a nuclear arms bazaar. Clearly after the A. Q. Khan events, a deal between Pakistan and the United States comparable to the one between the United States and India is highly unlikely given the prevailing political sentiments about Pakistan and the various threats it poses to itself and the region. So far, Pakistan's efforts to cultivate a parallel deal with China have not fructified.⁶⁹

Apart from affecting Pakistan's relations with the United States, Pakistan's nuclear status has also affected South Asian regional stability. There have been three crises over Kashmir since Pakistan has had a covert nuclear weapons capability (1989 onward) and overt capability (1998 onward). The first is the 1990 crisis, in which both states nearly went to war over the activities of ISI-backed militants in Indian-administered Kashmir. The second was the limited-aims Kargil war in 1999. The third was the stand-off along the Indian border in 2001–2002 following the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament by militants based in Pakistan. All three prompted international fears of escalation and potential nuclear use. The international community tried to use diplomatic pressure to diffuse tensions quickly.⁷⁰

Until the Kargil episode, some analysts believed that nuclear weapons might have a stabilizing effect on Indo-Pakistani relations because of the “stability-instability paradox,”⁷¹ the assertion that nuclear weap-

⁶⁹ Stephen Cohen, in his review of this manuscript, suggested that China (or perhaps France) may in fact be willing to provide such a deal even if a deal with the United States is unlikely.

⁷⁰ See Hagerty, 1995; P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen Philip Cohen, *Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia*, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003; P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen Philip Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007.

⁷¹ See Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989.

ons can stabilize security competition between two adversaries by precluding a major war between them.⁷² Evidence from the Indo-Pakistan security dyad suggests that nuclear capabilities *facilitate* conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum because decisionmakers may believe that nuclear weapons provide immunity against escalation.⁷³

The Kargil conflict underscored the importance of nuclear weapons to Pakistan's strategy toward India and Kashmir. It also provided strong evidence that nuclear weapons have been destabilizing. Pakistan's possession of these weapons was a critical *precondition* that enabled the planning and execution of the Kargil conflict inasmuch as such weapons ostensibly provided immunity against a full-scale Indian retaliatory response.⁷⁴ Pakistan's strategic assets deterred both Indian conventional and nuclear threats. Nuclear weapons were instruments by which Pakistan could galvanize international intervention on its behalf in the event that the political-military crisis spun out of control. India showed that it understood the value of Pakistan's nuclear assets by not escalating.⁷⁵ Pakistan publicly acknowledged this understanding: in April 1999, Musharraf (then the Chief of Army Staff) announced that even though nuclear weapons rendered large-scale conventional wars obsolete, proxy wars were very likely.⁷⁶ After the conflict subsided, numerous sources reported that Islamabad "bran-

⁷² For a discussion of proponents of this view, see Neil Joeck, *Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia*, New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper, 0567-932X, 1997.

⁷³ Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, "Introduction," in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., *The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia*, Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001. See also S. Paul Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 2, Fall 2008, pp. 71–94.

⁷⁴ Tellis, Fair, and Medby, 2001.

⁷⁵ Tellis, Fair, and Medby, 2001; Timothy D. Hoyt, "Kargil: The Nuclear Dimension," paper presented at the Kargil Book Project Conference, Monterey, Calif., May 30–31, 2002.

⁷⁶ Hoyt, 2002. See also, "Pak Defence Strong, Says Army Chief," *Independent*, April 19, 1999; Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, New Delhi, December 15, 1999; New Delhi/Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2000.

dished” nuclear threats during the crisis via ambiguous, but formal, statements by senior Pakistani policymakers. Pakistan also telegraphed the nuclear threat by activating at least one Pakistani missile base and possibly readying several missile systems.⁷⁷

While the nuclearization of South Asia has been stabilizing at the higher end of the conflict spectrum but destabilizing at the lower end, the conclusions that India and Pakistan have drawn from recent conflicts are dangerous for regional security. For Pakistan’s part, it believes that its possession of nuclear weapons in both crises *deterred* India from launching a larger offensive. For India’s part, it believes that its capability *compelled* Pakistan to back down. Such different conclusions do not bode well for the initiation, management, or conclusion of future conflicts.

India’s frustration with Pakistan’s use of subconventional approaches under the nuclear umbrella and desire to create a conflict space from which to punish Pakistan for its use of proxy elements or deter it from using these elements have resulted in various efforts to promulgate an Indian doctrine of limited war. India’s experience with the limited conflict in Kargil suggests to Indian strategic elites that “limited war” is indeed possible. This concept was formally introduced to the Indian and global publics in January 2000 when Indian political and military leaders argued that, based on the experience of Kargil, it was possible to wage a conventional war of limited objectives and dura-

⁷⁷ Raj Chengappa, “Pakistan Threatened India with Nuclear Weapons: Army Chief,” *Newspaper Today*, January 12, 2001; Bruce Riedel, *American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House*, Philadelphia, Penn.: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Policy Paper Series, 2002; Tellis, Fair, and Medby, 2001. There are some problems with the interpretation of these reports. For example, it is unclear whether the Pakistani ministers brandishing such threats had the legitimate authority to do so (e.g., Pakistan’s Religious Affairs Minister Raja Zafarul Haq who warned that Pakistan could resort to the nuclear option). Moreover, the “activation” of the missile systems could also have been a misreading. Any mobilization observed could have been a defensive move to protect Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from a preemptive Indian strike rather than an effort to enhance their operational readiness. The utility and danger in such signaling resides in conflicting interpretations and the potential reactions that they may elicit on the part of the adversary. While India and Pakistan have systems in place for advance notification of missile testing and for facilitating communication between military staffs, neither has a comprehensive crisis management system.

tion and contain this conflict below the nuclear threshold.⁷⁸ India's most recent innovation in this regard is the "Cold Start" doctrine, which was unveiled in 2004. Cold Start is intended to permit Indian forces to quickly mobilize to retaliate against Pakistan-supported militancy or other subconventional provocations. This doctrine calls for combined arms operating jointly with air support and signals a dramatic departure from the defensive orientation embraced since 1947.⁷⁹

Despite enthusiasm for this within India's military, it is unlikely to become an operational doctrine any time soon. It has served as a means to nudge the Indian interagency process on Pakistan. The outrageous Mumbai terrorist attack perpetrated by Pakistan's LeT in November 2008 will likely encourage India to redouble its efforts to make Cold Start operational. The Mumbai attack demonstrated the few militarily satisfactory options to punish and thereby deter Pakistan for permitting such groups to operate. However, Pakistan believes that India is going forward with Cold Start and is likely considering how it can respond to or subvert this effort.

While both states ponder what their future conflict space may look like, both have sustained a ceasefire in Kashmir and a bilateral dialogue since 2003, which addresses, among other issues, the Kashmir impasse. While little of substance has emerged from this dialogue, the main achievement has been to dampen the conflict in Kashmir. This dialogue and reduction of violence in Kashmir had been sustained at least in part because of Musharraf's policy of "moderated jihad" in Indian-held Kashmir and in part because of Indian patience despite episodic but large terrorist attacks within India by groups tied to Pakistan. In the wake of the November 2008 Mumbai attack, India suspended the so-called composite dialogue. The fate of this process is uncertain at the time of this writing.

Over the longer term, Pakistan's embrace—however tentative—of peace with India is uncertain. While Pakistan's leaders understand

⁷⁸ George Fernandes, "The Dynamics of Limited War," inaugural address given to the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, January 5, 2000.

⁷⁹ Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/2008, pp. 158–190.

that they cannot change the status quo in Kashmir through military means, despite the improved atmospherics over Kashmir, Pakistan's army may continue to take risks and continue supporting militant groups to undertake risks on behalf of the army. Moreover, Afghanistan has emerged as a new and dangerous theater for Indo-Pakistani brinkmanship. Without resolving the Indo-Pakistan security competition, the prospects for conventional and nuclear conflict will persist at least through the next decade.

Pakistan's Problematic Political Landscape

Pakistan's political parties are weak, highly centralized, and dominated by key personalities. This state of affairs is unlikely to change over the next ten years as a result of Musharraf's successful past efforts to sideline Pakistan's major political parties in an effort to promote his own preferred party. It will take some time for Pakistan's parties to regain what little institutional capacity they had prior to Musharraf's intervention.

The current political problems are not new. Pakistan's political parties have historically been weak, vulnerable to co-optation by Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies. Through offers of benefits and threats of punishment, the military regimes have persuaded various politicians to join new political parties that the regimes have formed to act on their behalf. Ayub Khan carved out the Convention Muslim League. General Zia also established a Muslim League under the leadership of Mohammad Khan Junejo. Both of these parties deliberately appropriated the name of the political movement, the Muslim League, that founded Pakistan. Musharraf, employing the services of the ISI to threaten and offer benefits, co-opted numerous politicians to populate his PML-Q.⁸⁰ However, while Islamist parties have drawn the attention of Western capitals, they have not fared well in free and fair elections.

⁸⁰ See discussion in International Crisis Group, *Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan*, Islamabad/Brussels, Asia Report No. 102, September 28, 2005; Rashid, 2008a; Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

There are now four principal non-Islamist parties in Pakistan and two main Islamist parties.⁸¹ With the exception of the Awami National Party (ANP) and JI, these parties have similar weaknesses. They tend to be centered on key personalities who demand loyalty and who tend to govern their parties through fiat rather than democratic procedures. PPP, PML-N, and the Muttehida Quami Mahaz (MQM) are often derisively referred to as tightly held “personality cults.” With the exception of JI, these parties are not democratically organized. The parties dole out opportunities to contest constituencies (“tickets”) according to party loyalty and patronage rather than an individual’s political following or ability to govern. Decisionmaking, to varying degrees, is tightly controlled by powerful party secretariats in which party constituencies are narrowly represented. Pakistan’s parties, while issuing manifestos, do not often develop policies that differentiate one party from the other. They rarely center their campaigns on policy issues. With the exception of JI, the parties do not support policy research. Pakistan has no truly independent organizations to develop public policy options or to lead debates.

Most parties are strongly regionally based. This is true of PPP, which is strongest in Sindh, even though PPP has a stronger national standing than the other parties. The main constituencies are rooted in local castes, clans, ethnicities, or family interests. Political leaders tend to be more interested in providing patronage and seeking rents while in power than they are in providing better government services. At best, parties aggregate provincial or ethnic interests rather than national interests. While they do form coalitions, these coalitions are undergirded by the mathematics of distributing power and patronage rather than a policy-driven political consensus or the needs of the citizens.⁸²

⁸¹ In addition to these political parties, Pakistan has many smaller parties that represent particular sectarian religious, ethnic, or regional political interests. Muttehida Quami Mahaz and the Awami National Party are intensely regional parties, representing Karachi Mohajirs and Pashtuns, respectively. Whereas the Awami National Party is currently an ally of the Pakistan’s People’s Party–led government, Muttehida Quami Mahaz was an important component of the pro-Musharraf coalition.

⁸² International Crisis Group, 2005; Rashid, 2008a; Cohen, 2004; Hamid Khan, 2001; Baxter et al., 2002, pp. 169–240.

Pakistan's political malaise is tied to chronic political turbulence: With the exception of the 2002 national assembly, no government has ever served its full term. (While that assembly served its term, there were two prime ministers and one interim prime minister during that period.) Parties have little expectation that they will serve out a full term. This expectation conditions party elites to maximize rents during their tenure because they are likely to spend several years in opposition or, in the case of a military coup, in jail. Opposition parties need not—and thus do not—allow a sitting government to serve its term because they have extra-constitutional means to prorogue the national assembly and win in early elections. Both the PPP and the PML-N have prevailed upon the army to interfere with and destabilize sitting governments. The army has been willing to play this role because it ensures the fractious political nature of politics and minimizes the odds of serious efforts to deprive the army of its power. Because of the ability of the army and the ISI to destabilize a sitting government, most prime ministers are wary of antagonizing the military by challenging its preferred courses of action. Not surprisingly, few governments have had the strength to exercise civilian control over the military. The end result has been that Pakistanis have rarely been able to judge the politicians through the exercise of the ballot box in free and fair elections. Politicians have not been held repeatedly accountable to the electorate through elections.⁸³

Principal Political Parties

PPP emerged from the post-1971 Pakistan as the dominant political party. It has been and remains most firmly rooted among the dominant feudal landlords of rural Sindh. It is the only party that enjoys national standing, although some observers believe that it is becoming more regional following Benazir Bhutto's death.⁸⁴ While PPP has often purported to have solid "left of center" credentials, it has formed alliances with religious parties when needed. Its founder, Zulfikar Bhutto, actually pioneered the Islamization of Pakistan by outlawing alcohol

⁸³ See various discussions of civilian military intrigue in Siddiqi, 2007.

⁸⁴ Author discussions in Pakistan in April 2008.

and gambling, declaring the Ahmediyas to be non-Muslim, and by deliberately cultivating cultural ties with Arab states after the loss of Bangladesh in 1971.⁸⁵

Underscoring the dynastic rather than democratic organization of the party, Benazir Bhutto took over after her father's assassination. When Bhutto's last will and testament was read following her assassination, she declared that the reins of the party should fall to her college-age son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. While he completes his studies, the effective leadership of the party fell to her widower Asif Zardari.⁸⁶ The party leadership is likely to be successfully transferred to her son, intimating that little is likely to change in Pakistan's largest, most national party over the course of the next decade.

Opposite the PPP in the political spectrum is Sharif's PML-N, which is right of center. PML-N traditionally draws its support from the Punjab; it particularly appeals to Punjab's elites, especially owners of large amounts of land (the "feudals"), the urban business community industrialists, and former bureaucrats. PML-N is also popular among the well educated and religious conservatives. The party won the second largest portion of seats in the national assembly and became a part of the governing coalition in 2008.

ANP has evolved considerably in the last decade. In the past, ANP espoused socialism and staunch secularism, sought to remain with India at partition, and vigorously promoted Pashtun nationalism and Pakhtunistan or Pakhtunwa (the desire to unite the Pashtuns of both Afghanistan and Pakistan in a single homeland). In light of Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pashtun territory in Pakistan, ANP had been a perpetual irritant to the central government. ANP's traditional support base is limited to ethnic Pashtuns in parts of NWFP, FATA, and Pashtun areas of Baluchistan. In recent years, because of the large number of Pashtuns who have migrated to Karachi, ANP has organized in Karachi, where it now rivals MQM and Sindhi nationalists.

⁸⁵ Zulfikar Bhutto had hoped that by appealing to Islam he could dampen the ethnic tensions that were emergent within the state and that brought about the loss of Bangladesh.

⁸⁶ See discussion in International Crisis Group, 2005; Cohen, 2004, pp. 134–137; Baxter et al., 2002, pp. 202–203.

Whereas in the 2002 elections, Pashtuns in the frontier and Baluchistan tended to vote for the Islamist party Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), in the 2008 election, ANP experienced a surprising resurgence, soundly defeating JUI. (In some areas JUI also did well.) This victory reflected Pashtun discontent with the poor performance of the Islamist provincial government in NWFP, growing concerns about Islamist militancy, and the belief that JUI was accommodating the militants' agenda and activities too much.

ANP has supported Pakistani national goals, seeking to establish a role for itself counter to the Islamist militancy that has arisen in Pashtun areas in recent years. While many were optimistic that ANP could help contain the militants, it has not been successful thus far, in part, because dealing with the militants is in the military's portfolio—not in that of the political parties. In spite of its limited remit, ANP has tried to engage the Pashtun public on the problem of Islamist militancy even if the army is not seeking a solution. Baitullah Mehsud, a leader of the Pakistani Taliban, perhaps in recognition of ANP's popularity and its stand against militancy, warned the liberal ANP to quit the government or brace for retaliation. Despite his threats, ANP has continued to oppose the Pakistani Taliban and other militants.⁸⁷

The fourth significant party is MQM or United National Movement. Prior to 1997, MQM was known as the Mohajir Quami Mahaz, reflecting the fact that its primary constituency is the largely urban, Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in Sindh. While MQM is rooted to this ethnic group, it is not necessarily tied to a region, although its traditional stronghold has been Karachi and other cities in Sindh. While MQM has a strong following among the middle and lower-middle class, it obtains funds from Mohajir traders and business houses. MQM's principle leader, Altaf Hussain, has retained control over his party despite living outside of Pakistan, as did Bhutto and Sharif. MQM came into being as a counterbalance to Zulfikar Bhutto's efforts to mollify ethnic Sindhis, who felt oppressed by the Mohajirs who had settled in Kara-

⁸⁷ Daud Khatak, "Baitullah Mehsud's Threat to ANP: Political Leaders in NWFP Tread Cautiously," *Daily Times*, July 20, 2008. While ANP condemned this, both PML-N and PPP did not and even offered exculpatory explanations for the threat.

chi and other parts of Sindh. In the 1980s, MQM was associated with attacks against ethnic Sindhis and Baloch in Karachi. MQM, while a successful political party, still retains a mafia-like reputation among its political opponents. MQM was a political ally of Musharraf, himself a Mohajir, because he opposed PPP in Sindh.

Compared with PPP and PML-N, Islamist parties tend to have the most clearly articulated ideologies. They tend to follow particular sectarian traditions, with the notable exception of JI. JI is the largest and most ideologically coherent of Pakistan's Islamist political parties. Founded in 1941 by Maulana Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, JI eschews sectarian divisions. Like other Islamist parties in Pakistan, it has sought to use domestic politics to advance Islamic issues. JI vigorously opposed the Family Law Ordinance of 1961, which eventually gave women limited rights concerning divorce, polygamy, and remarriage. It opposed the Women's Protection Bill, which passed in November 2006 and reversed some of the most controversial aspects of General Zia's Hudood Ordinance. JI has built a large, nationwide chain of schools as well as madaris and runs many medical clinics in an effort to expand its presence throughout Pakistan. These social services have enabled JI to cultivate political support and expand its organization. JI is organized in cells along Leninist organization lines; it runs several affiliated organizations aimed at expanding its ranks. Most notable among these is Al Huda, an educational and outreach organization that mostly targets women through adult Islamic education and other Islamic remedial educational and social programs.⁸⁸ Syed Munawar Hasan is the amir (leader) of JI.⁸⁹

JI, more so than the other religious parties in Pakistan, has maintained an active international religious-political agenda. Consonant with this role, JI has taken positions and influenced Pakistan's foreign policies concerning Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. It

⁸⁸ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *International Relations of an Islamist Movement: The Case of the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, February 2000; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan*, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1994; International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, Islamabad/Brussels, Asia Report No. 49, March 20, 2003.

⁸⁹ Until March 2009, the amir was Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who was amir from 1987 to 2009.

has considerable reach internationally. It played an important role in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, funneling money from ISI to JI-influenced groups and training some mujahideen. JI is believed to have tight control over several “indigenous” militant organizations operating in Indian-administered Kashmir (e.g., Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and Al-Badar). JI has ties with the Ikhwanul Muslimeen (the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt) and with Bangladeshi and Indian chapters of JI. The writings of Mawdudi have been influential throughout the Muslim world, generating considerable interest in JI far beyond Pakistan. JI also runs research organizations, such as the Islamabad-based Institute of Policy Studies, which conducts and publishes research on domestic and foreign policy issues confronting Pakistan and critical issues in contemporary Islam and the Muslim world.⁹⁰

The Pakistani public generally believes that JI conducts party business in ways that are more democratic than the mainstream parties. It is perceived as less corrupt and more disciplined. It is a tightly knit organization with a strong following among the urban middle class, the bureaucracy, the military, and other educated professionals. It has had long-standing ties with the military and intelligence agencies. In recent years, a number of high-profile military personalities have joined JI. Despite its ideological coherence, military patronage, and often-lauded “street power,” JI’s showing at the polls has been unimpressive. In the 1993 general elections, it allied with smaller religious parties and won only six seats. It boycotted the 1997 elections. In the 1980s, it forfeited its political position in Karachi to MQM. JI was the second-largest component of the Islamist coalition, Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which contested general elections in 2002 and local government elections in 2005.⁹¹ Under the banner of MMA, JI was able to regain some ground in Karachi because of conflicts with MQM and because of popular support for MMA, mostly from Pash-tun migrants to the city. JI enjoys support north of the Khyber and in other parts of NWFP, where it competes with JUI. In Punjab, much of JI’s power base overlaps with the constituency of PML-N. JI boycotted

⁹⁰ Nasr, 1994 and 2000; International Crisis Group, 2003.

⁹¹ Nasr, 1994 and 2000; International Crisis Group, 2003.

the 2008 elections, believing that the military would rig the vote to its disadvantage. Its decision contributed to the collapse of MMA in that election.

If one looks only at electoral outcomes as a measure of strength, it is easy to underestimate the importance of JI. When measured in organizational skills, political experience, and influence within the state, JI is probably the most powerful religious lobby in Pakistan. It will remain an important source of influence within the military and an important actor in Pakistan's civil society. Its alleged ties to al Qaeda, support for the Taliban, and a raft of other Islamist militant groups merit continued concern.⁹²

JUI was the largest component of MMA and the single most important Deobandi political organization in Pakistan.⁹³ JUI is divided into several personality-focused factions, the most important of which is led by Fazlur Rehman (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam [JUI-F]). A second faction led by Sami ul Haq (Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam [JUI-S]) was also prominent until recent years. JUI factions routinely contest elections and have formed alliances with nonreligious parties (e.g., PPP and PML-Q).

Both Rehman and Sami ul Haq have inherited their religious and political leadership roles, and both control vast networks of Deobandi madaris. Rehman's influence extends to most of NWFP and even the Pashtun areas of Baluchistan. These madaris provide party workers and political leadership to JUI. They have also educated cadres and leaders of the Afghan mujahideen and other Afghan militias, including the Taliban and the Deobandi militant organizations. JUI is deeply implicated in supporting a wide array of Deobandi militants, including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, and various sectarian and other militant groups operating within Pakistan and the region. JUI enjoys overlapping membership with many of these groups, as the Deobandi mili-

⁹² See various discussions of JI support of Islamist militancy in Rashid, 2008a.

⁹³ Deoband is a puritanical, Islamic reform movement that began in what is now Deoband, India. It is one of the important interpretive Muslim traditions in Pakistan.

tant groups emerged from a shared network of madaris and mosques, and they espouse the same religious ideology as JUI.⁹⁴

While adherents to the Deobandi tradition remained a small minority through the 1970s, General Zia cultivated the Deobandi mullahs to give himself a degree of religious authority to add to his political clout. Since the late 1970s, Deobandis' influence has grown substantially. At present, Deobandis are thought to represent some 15 percent of the Pakistani populace; they control the largest share of madaris in Pakistan.⁹⁵ JUI has been the most vocal in demanding that Pakistan be a "Muslim" state. Deobandi organizations are responsible for the anti-Shia violence that has taken place in recent decades.

While JUI and JI were important partners in MMA, differences between JUI-F and JI emerged over the willingness of the former to cooperate with Musharraf. Consequently, the alliance began to fray, and MMA is now defunct. Unlike JI, JUI participated in the 2008 elections. JUI was soundly defeated in NWFP, in part because JI worked to undermine it in those areas and elsewhere. Should the current government fall and fresh elections be called, JI would probably participate. However, given the public distaste for the Islamist parties, neither JI nor JUI would be expected to do well. Both parties will retain their ability to mobilize their supporters and bring them into the streets. These Islamist parties remain a potent source of pressure on the government.

Pakistan's Internal Security Challenges

Pakistan is likely to experience a continued proliferation of militant groups that target Afghanistan, India, domestic political groups and leaders, and Pakistan's security forces and intelligence agencies. Deo-

⁹⁴ For a discussion of MMA officeholders facilitating the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups, see various discussions in Rashid, 2008a.

⁹⁵ There are no robust data detailing sectarian commitments among Pakistanis. While Deobandis control the largest portion of Pakistan's registered and affiliated madaris, Barelvis have more shrines in Pakistan than do the Deobandis. See Institute of Policy Studies, *Pakistan: Religious Education Institution, An Overview*, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2002.

bandi groups are most likely to pose the greatest security challenges to the Pakistani government and citizenry alike. Pakistan's handling of its growing problems will be hampered by the Pakistani army's preoccupation with India, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. Because of these security concerns, Pakistan's security forces are unlikely to make a strategic move away from using militants as instruments of policy and move decisively against them. The Pakistani government is likely to engage some militants in hopes of securing domestic peace, while seeking to eliminate leaders intent on destabilizing the state. However, the government has not been successful in its efforts to eliminate key militants, and its efforts to confront them have come at a high price in terms of loss of life, encouraging wider forms of militancy and galvanizing public support against military action.⁹⁶

While Pakistan continues to contend with Baloch insurgents in Baluchistan, key leaders have been eliminated. Because the sources of the conflict have not been addressed, the state will likely continue to suppress Baluch political and militant organizations alike. However, because Baluchistan is the least populous province with the lowest population density, this conflict will not seriously challenge the state. While Mohajirs, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Baloch are likely to engage in violence in Karachi over access to jobs, markets, real estate, positions within the government, racketeering, and business opportunities, the state has been able to keep a handle on the violence—albeit with massive use of force and human rights violations. Shia-Sunni clashes are likely to continue because of the Deobandi. These conflicts could become bloodier if Iran resumes its past support for Shia groups within Pakistan.

The most serious challenge to state authority and security will be the ongoing developments in the tribal areas and NWFP. The state has a demonstrable record of engaging militants with an excessive use of force followed by bouts of appeasement and accommodation of mili-

⁹⁶ See discussion in Manjeet Singh Pardesi, "The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan at Islamabad's Red Mosque," in C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, eds., *Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 88–116.

tants. Until April 2009, the Pakistan government seemed to lack the capability and will to deny the militants unfettered ability to establish “micro-emirates” of sharia. At the time of this writing, it remains unclear whether the army will prevail. Its operations have displaced more than three million people from Swat and FATA, and the army has demonstrated a striking inability to hold ground that it has cleared of militants at a high price. Worse, the Pakistani civilian bureaucracy has proven unable to provide government services and security to the conflict-affected areas. What is clear is that the army has not declared war on all militants: only those operating under the banner of the Pakistani Taliban. Other groups that claim to target India remain functional. It remains to be seen what—if anything—will compel the Pakistani state to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign policy.

There are two wild cards in this discussion. The first is the views of the national security establishment. Since the July 2007 Red Mosque affair, there has been a debate within Pakistan about the need to abandon government support for militants as a foreign policy tool.⁹⁷ Pivotal events, such as the assassination of key army leaders by Islamist militants, could lend added impetus to this debate. Second, the Pakistani populace may demand a different approach if militant groups continue to attack such cities as Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad in the Punjab heartland and if the public’s preferred approach of “peace deals” fail to provide security.⁹⁸ Indeed, as of June 2009, there is evidence that this is taking place. Polling by the Program on International Policy Attitudes from May 2009 suggests that Pakistanis have become some-

⁹⁷ In summer 2007, the Pakistan Army moved in and essentially leveled Islamabad’s Red Mosque. Militants had ensconced themselves in the mosque and in the adjoining girls’ madrassah. Activists based in the mosque pursued vigilante purity campaigns in nearby markets, harassed women who were not completely veiled, and kidnapped “massage therapists” and police officers among other criminal activities. The mosque had long been a redoubt of Islamist and sectarian militants and had been well-known to the ISI.

⁹⁸ Polling on these issues has been consistent. See Fair, Ramsay, and Kull, 2008. See also Gallup Pakistan, “Press Release on Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination,” January 11, 2008; IRI, 2008c.

what more supportive of military strikes, less optimistic about the ability of peace deals to bring peace, and thus, less supportive of them.⁹⁹

Islamism, Militancy, and the State

For decades Pakistan has used both Islamism and militant Islam as tools of foreign and domestic policy. Civilian and military governments alike have co-opted Islamists to garner legitimacy and to insulate their regimes from opposition. Most recently, MMA was Musharraf's opposition of choice emerging from the 2002 elections. The various relationships between the security establishment and the Islamist political parties have also served other purposes. Many Islamist political parties have had important ties with Islamist militant groups that have been active in India, Indian-administered Kashmir, Afghanistan, and within Pakistan. These groups have been employed by the army and intelligence agencies as proxies through which the state prosecutes its interests in those theaters. The state worked through JI and Deobandi institutions to cultivate and provide assistance to the "mujahideen" during the internationally supported jihad to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The state also relied upon Deobandi organizations to fulfill a similar role during the Taliban period. Many Deobandis, JI, and other sectarian organizations were mobilized to support militants in Kashmir.

Until the commencement of the U.S.-led "global war on terror," the military and religious leaders and militant groups generally shared similar perceptions of threats and objectives. Prior to 2002, it was possible to distinguish distinct types of militant groups that varied in sectarian outlook, objectives, and theaters of operation. Several militant groups focused on Kashmir and India. While these groups shared operational focus, they differed in their sectarian outlooks: LeT is an Ahl-

⁹⁹ Polling available from IRI has long shown that Pakistanis overwhelmingly support peace deals and are ambivalent about military operations. This trend held even during the most recent survey fielded in March 2009. See IRI, *IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey, March 7–30, 2009*, 2009. A Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll, fielded in May 2009, found that Pakistanis are less ambivalent about military action and more ambivalent about peace deals (prerelease communications with PIPA on June 19, 2009; author C. Christine Fair helped with that survey effort).

e-Hadith organization; Al Badr and HM are tied to JI; and Harkat ul Ansar (HUA), Harkat ul Mujahideen (HUM), Harkat ul Jihad Islami (HUJI), and JM share ties with the Deobandi religious and political leadership.¹⁰⁰ While these groups may have espoused larger goals (e.g., fomenting Hindu-Muslim discord in India, supporting jihads in other theaters), they largely remained focused upon Kashmir and acted either in Indian-administered Kashmir or the Indian hinterland to achieve these goals.¹⁰¹

The most prominent Islamist sectarian groups are the anti-Shia Deobandi organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP), which also functioned as a political party. These sectarian and India/Kashmir-focused Deobandi groups always had overlapping memberships with each other and with different components of JUI. JUI and these Deobandi groups forged ties with the Taliban, which came out of Pakistan's Deobandi madaris.

Many of these Kashmir-oriented and sectarian groups cemented ties with the Afghan Taliban leadership through Deobandi madaris and shared militant networks, camps, and supply lines in Afghanistan. Many, especially Deobandi groups, developed networks with al Qaeda and became their local operatives in Pakistan. Al Qaeda's presence in Pakistan prior to 9/11 probably relied heavily upon these networks. Prior to 9/11, Pakistan's varied militant groups enjoyed political patronage, support from the military and intelligence agencies, and overt public support. Groups routinely and openly solicited donations and recruited members throughout Pakistan.¹⁰²

Pakistan has been subject to a number of ethnic militant conflicts. Apart from the Baluchistan conflict, in the 1980s conflicts in Sindh resulted in military action to restore peace to Karachi after

¹⁰⁰These groups have been banned and have reformed under new names, unfamiliar to most readers. We have retained the more familiar names while noting that the groups no longer use them.

¹⁰¹C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 27, No. 6, November/December 2004b, pp. 489–504.

¹⁰²Author fieldwork in Pakistan in 2000 involved visiting "recruitment" and "fundraising" stalls during Eid in Lahore.

armed conflict between the ethnic Mohajirs and ethnic Sindhis. There have also been other episodes of violence, such as anti-Shia attacks in the Northern Areas and past bouts of ethnic conflict in the Pashtun areas (e.g., FATA and NWFP). Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, these insurgent and militant activities are not connected to the wider Islamist militancy in Pakistan.¹⁰³

The Post-9/11 Militant Landscape

Pakistan has become increasingly unstable since 9/11. The influx of members of the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda after they were forced out of Afghanistan has been a major factor in the deteriorating security situation. U.S. and Pakistani policies to combat al Qaeda and deal with the Taliban have at times exacerbated Pakistan's security problems. Under pressure from the United States, the Pakistani government stopped or diminished official support for the Afghan Taliban and other such groups. In the wake of the 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistan military crisis and the allegations that the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 was conducted by Pakistan-based militant groups, the U.S. government pressured the Pakistani government to scale back militant activities in India and Kashmir. In response, President Musharraf forged a new policy of “moderated jihad” in Kashmir.¹⁰⁴

Many militant groups bridled at these restrictions. While LeT and the various JI-backed groups retained party discipline, some of the Deobandi groups resisted directives from the Pakistan government. Such groups as JM splintered; some factions began to attack the Pakistani state. Many of the Deobandi groups, such as HUJI, HUA,

¹⁰³Theodore P. Wright, “Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 3, April 1991, pp. 299–312; Charles H. Kennedy, “The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 10, October 1991, pp. 938–955; Farhat Haq, “Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 11, November 1995, pp. 990–1004; International Crisis Group, *Discord in Pakistan's Northern Areas*, Islamabad/Brussels, Asia Report No. 131, April 2, 2007a; International Crisis Group, 2007b; Grare, 2006; International Crisis Group, *Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants*, Islamabad/Brussels, Asia Report No. 125, December 11, 2006.

¹⁰⁴See discussion in Fair and Chalk, 2006.

and HUM, began targeting key members of the Pakistani leadership, including Musharraf himself. Sectarian groups, such as LeT and SSP, working with other Deobandi groups, attacked Pakistani and foreign interests and individuals, including Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, the Karachi Corps Commander General Hayat, Minister of Interior Aftab Khan Sherpao, French engineers in Karachi, and a Christian church in Islamabad.¹⁰⁵ Many militant groups relocated personnel, training, and other facilities to various parts of FATA, where they began training Afghan and Pakistani insurgents and making incursions into Afghanistan.¹⁰⁶

South and North Waziristan and Bajaur tribal agencies have been the primary sanctuaries for al Qaeda, Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, and allied fighters. Under U.S. pressure, Pakistan prosecuted military operations against militants in FATA starting in 2002. Pakistan's operations in FATA varied in scale, intensity, and efficacy. They largely targeted al Qaeda elements (including Central Asians). When Washington has applied extreme pressure, select Afghan Taliban activists have also been targeted. In response to Islamabad's 2004 operations in South Waziristan, a FATA-based Pashtun insurgency developed in South Waziristan. It then spread to North Waziristan and Bajaur. Insurgents began operating in most of the agencies and even adjoining settled areas.

Throughout the FATA agencies and nearby areas, locally operating Pakistani Taliban use coercion to take resources. They suppress local dissent by eliminating tribal elders and other religious, political, and government authorities who oppose them, among other measures. They have mobilized deepening Pashtun antipathy toward the Musharraf-led military policies, his alliance with the United States, and the American "occupation" of Afghanistan to develop support among Pashtuns. The Pakistani Taliban have also been accepted as providers of security

¹⁰⁵For discussions of the reorganizations see Amir Mir, *The True Face of Jihadis*, Lahore, Pakistan: Mashal Books, 2004; Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

¹⁰⁶Author interviews in Kabul between June and October, 2007. See also "FATA Militants Commit to Fight in Afghanistan," *Daily Times*, July 15, 2008; Gannon, 2008.

and swift (if draconian) justice. As a result, they have successfully established micro-emirates modeled after the (Afghan) Taliban's regime in Afghanistan in some territories in which they are present.¹⁰⁷

Episodic but deadly U.S. incursions into South and North Waziristan and Bajaur have contributed to the Talibanization of FATA and adjoining areas. In October 2006, U.S. Hellfire missiles struck a madrassah in Damadola (Bajaur), reportedly a stronghold of al Qaeda.¹⁰⁸ Some 82 people were killed, many of them students. Within one week, Pakistani Taliban, likely working with Deobandi groups such as LeT and SSP, launched their first suicide attack against Pakistani security forces, targeting an army training center in Dargai in Malakand, outside of FATA.¹⁰⁹ Since then, Pakistani Taliban have used suicide attacks against a wide range of Pakistani government targets in FATA and beyond. The Pakistan Army has been incapable of employing effective counterinsurgency tactics against the Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani security forces have had problems with morale and allegiance. Soldiers, especially in FC, have often balked at fighting relatives, friends, coreligionists, and compatriots who have joined the ranks of the insurgents. Soldiers have deserted, stating that they did not join the army to kill Pakistanis.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷See, inter alia, Graham Usher, "The Pakistan Taliban," *Middle East Report Online*, February 13, 2007; Laila Bokhari, *Waziristan—Impact on the Taliban Insurgency and the Stability of Pakistan*, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, FFI/RAPPORT-2006/02894, 2006; Shafiq Ahmad, "Unstoppable Taliban," *Herald*, March 2007, pp. 76–78; Zaffar Abbas, "Enduring Failure," *Herald*, February 2006, pp. 52–58; M. Ilyas Khan, "Back to the Drawing Board: Pakistan's Military Establishment Needs to Urgently Rethink Its Afghan Policy," *Herald*, February 2006a, pp. 59–61.

¹⁰⁸The U.S. government does not formally acknowledge airstrikes in Pakistan, in part because the drone program is generally a CIA program. See GlobalSecurity.org, "MQ-9 Reaper," October 11, 2008; "US drone strike kills 27 in Bajaur," *The Nation* (Pakistan), October 26, 2009; and Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, "Gunning for Al Qaeda Prime," *Stratfor*, June 27, 2007.

¹⁰⁹M. Ilyas Khan, "'Ominous Omens' for Pakistan's Army," *BBC News*, November 8, 2006b.

¹¹⁰Usher, 2007; C. Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and J. Alexander Thier, *Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Peace Briefing, December 2006; Ghafar Ali Khan, "The Lost Frontier?" *Herald*, July 2007; Zahid

To avoid direct engagement, the military has signed more than half a dozen agreements with militants in the Waziristan, Bajaur, Swat, and other locales. These deals have ratified the Pakistani security forces' defeat in these areas. They also bestow legitimacy on the Pakistani Taliban as political entities. All of the agreements recognize the Pakistani Taliban groups as bargaining partners, compensate them for their human and material losses (but do not ask the Taliban to compensate their victims), and allow the Taliban to retain their weapons and to establish sharia. In return, the Taliban agree to cease and desist from harboring foreign militants, to refrain from engaging in operations in Afghanistan, and to cease targeting Pakistani state assets and personnel. The Pakistani security forces do not insist on incorporating means of verifying these commitments in the agreements. As a consequence, the militants have honored these accords only in the breach.¹¹¹ NATO and U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan have also noted, with dismay, that immediately after an agreement has been signed, attacks in Afghanistan go up sharply.¹¹²

Part of the current and future challenge of reducing attacks in Pakistan (and Afghanistan) stems from the large number of separate but related militancies that exist across the Pashtun belt. Each insurgent group has local roots in the agencies in which it operates. They are bound by, or restricted in their mobility and expansion by, tribal politics. Despite these challenges to forming "grand alliances," in October 2007 credible Pakistani press reports stated that five different militant groups were operating under the banner of the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (the Taliban Movement of Pakistan [TTP]). By December 2007, TTP had reportedly coalesced around the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. However, few believe TTP was tightly controlled by Mehsud. Rather, TTP appears to be more of a network of militant command-

Hussain, "Are We Losing the War Against Militancy?" *Newsline*, July 2008; Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 2008, pp. 1–4.

¹¹¹ Usher, 2007; Sharad Joshi, "Is Pakistan Appeasing the Taliban?" *Foreign Policy in Focus Strategic Dialogue*, June 13, 2008.

¹¹² Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan's Prickly Foreign Relations," *BBC News*, June 10, 2008c. See also Jones, 2007.

ers who are allied, sometimes tactically and episodically.¹¹³ As the term “Pakistani Taliban” is used by Pakistani sources, this book uses this term for brevity. The Pakistan Taliban, howsoever constituted, are distinct from the Afghan Taliban even though they claim to espouse allegiance to the Afghan Taliban’s amir (leader) Mullah Omar. They have set goals of imposing sharia in their localities. (Longtime analysts of this insurgency doubt the coherence ascribed to the movement while recognizing the importance of local jihadi leaders).¹¹⁴ TTP and the recently killed Baitullah Mehsud are believed to be responsible for a sustained suicide attack campaign that spanned 2006 through much of 2009 throughout Pakistan, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and attacks against police in Lahore, the Federal Investigative Agency Office in Lahore, the Naval War College in Lahore, ISI headquarters in Rawalpindi, and Pakistani security forces in the Pashtun belt.

The Pakistan military’s cessation of direct action in January 2008 was followed by a sharp decline in suicide attacks in Pakistan. Many Pakistanis supported the agreements at least in part because they restored a modicum of normalcy. However, the decline in violence came at a price. The state ceded territory and sovereignty throughout FATA and other Pashtun areas to these groups. The militant infrastructure has remained intact, and militants have been allowed to expand their operations, making FATA one of the most important al Qaeda redoubts. Many terrorist operations in Europe have been planned in FATA or have used terrorist training facilities in FATA. Militant attacks in Afghanistan have motivated the United States and NATO to act, destroying targets in FATA. These operations have further roiled the Pashtun militants. If the status quo persists, over the course of the next decade these groups will continue to proliferate, consolidate gains, and destabilize the region and Pakistan as a whole.

¹¹³ Abbas, 2008.

¹¹⁴ Author conversations with Mariam Abou Zahab in July 2008.


Demographic Trends

Population Growth

Pakistan has a population of 173 million, making it the sixth most populous country in the world and the second most populous Muslim country after Indonesia.¹¹⁵ Of Pakistan's four provinces, Punjab is the most populous, accounting for 37 percent of the total, followed by Sindh (24 percent), NWFP (14 percent), and Baluchistan (5 percent).¹¹⁶

Pakistan's population was growing rapidly until the 1990s, after which rates of growth fell (see Figure 2.1). Although mortality rates

Figure 2.1
Comparison of Population Growth Rates in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India



SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, various years.

NOTES: An alternative source of population projections, UNDP, projects slightly higher growth rates in Pakistan between 2005 and 2015 than the U.S. Census Bureau, 1.9 percent compared with 1.8 percent. Projections of population growth rates for Bangladesh differ much more substantially, 1.6 percent (UNDP) compared with 1.95 percent (U.S. Census Bureau).

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¹¹⁵ See Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Pakistan," July 2008. For a somewhat lower figure, see United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Indicators—2007/2008 Report*, New York: Human Development Report Office, 2007/2008b, p. 245.

¹¹⁶ Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), *Social Development in Pakistan, 2006–2007*, Karachi, 2007. Pakistan includes not only these four provinces but also the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Islamabad Capital Territory, Azad Kashmir, and Gilgat Baltistan (pieces of Kashmir). The remaining population resides in these areas.

began to fall in the 1950s, fertility rates began to decline significantly only since the 1970s. They remain around four children per woman.¹¹⁷

Across Pakistan, rural areas have significantly higher fertility rates than urban areas. These higher rates of population growth are putting pressure on wages in rural areas and are likely to increase the disparity between rural and urban standards of living.¹¹⁸

Pakistan's fertility rates have fallen more slowly than India's. Some analysts cite lack of access to family planning; others point to cultural factors that encourage the desire to have more children. Studies tend to support the latter. Increasing opportunities for education for girls also reduce fertility rates, more so than increased access to family planning services.¹¹⁹ The desire to have more children appears to be affected by economic and cultural determinants.¹²⁰

The U.S. Census Bureau and the United Nations project that population growth rates will continue to decline because of declines in fertility rates over the next two decades. Slower population growth rates are likely to be beneficial to future governments, slightly easing future pressures for public services. However, Pakistan's very large, poor population will continue to challenge the ability of Pakistan's government to provide public services. Moreover, a return to more rapid rates of growth would compound the government's problems.

Urbanization

In addition to experiencing a youth bulge, Pakistan, like many developing countries, has faced rapid growth in its urban population (see

¹¹⁷ Exact estimates of fertility rates differ. UNDP puts it at 4 children per female for 2000–2005 (UNDP, 2007/2008b, p. 245); U.S. Census Bureau puts it at 3.7 (U.S. Census Bureau, *International Data Base (IDB)*, “Country Rankings,” 2000–2005).


¹¹⁸ On regional differences, see also Shireen J. Jejeebhoy and Zeba A. Sathar, “Women's Autonomy in India and Pakistan: The Influence of Religion and Region,” *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 687–712.

¹¹⁹ Zeba A. Sathar, Cynthia B. Lloyd, Cem Mete, and Minhaj ul Haque, “Schooling Opportunities for Girls as a Stimulus for Fertility Change in Rural Pakistan,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 51, No. 3, April 2003, pp. 677–698.

¹²⁰ Zeba A. Sathar and John B. Casterline, “The Onset of Fertility Transition in Pakistan,” *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 1998, pp. 773–796.

Figure 2.2). Although Pakistan's population is not yet as urbanized as in more-developed countries, recent decades have witnessed a steady influx into Pakistan's cities, eight of which will be home to over one million people by 2010.¹²¹ With a population of 13 million in 2010, Karachi is already a megacity, the second largest in the Muslim world after Dhaka in Bangladesh (population 14.8 million).¹²² Urbanization is projected to continue to accelerate in the next decade. Karachi's projected average annual growth rate for 2005–2015 is 3.1 percent, just behind the world's fastest growing cities of Lagos, Nigeria, and Dhaka, which are growing at 3.2 percent.

Figure 2.2
Population Living in Urban Areas



SOURCE: United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database*, New York: United Nations, Development, Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2007.

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¹²¹Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Hyderabad, Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi.

¹²²United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision*, "Fact Sheet 7, Mega-Cities," New York: United Nations, Development, Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2005.

Urban conditions, like living conditions in much of the rest of Pakistan, are often poor. In Karachi, 40 percent of the population lives in slums that receive few, if any, public services. Because of popular dissatisfaction with the government, police often spend their time controlling demonstrations rather than preventing or investigating crimes.¹²³ However, judging from the continued influx of people, cities offer better economic prospects than the countryside. Moreover, during the recent period of rapid economic growth in Karachi, the city government has attempted to provide better services.¹²⁴

The Economy

Economic Growth


Between 2000 and 2008, economic growth in Pakistan was stronger than in the 1990s, averaging 5.4 percent between 2000 and 2008, up from 3.9 percent in the 1990s (see Figure 2.3). Pakistan has participated in the acceleration in economic growth in this decade that has taken place across most of the developing world, including on the Indian subcontinent. Better macroeconomic management, trade liberalization, and some progress on reducing microeconomic impediments to economic growth have been key factors in more-rapid growth. Sales of state-owned assets to private investors have helped improve the productivity of capital, reduced drains on the budget from loss-making state-owned enterprises, and brought in additional revenues to the government.

Pakistan has not enjoyed the very rapid rates of growth as India, which has averaged 7.6 percent per year in this decade. When translated into growth in per capita income, the differences are quite large: between 2000 and 2008, on average per capita gross domestic prod-

¹²³Ellen Brennan-Galvin, "Populations on the Move: Crime and Violence in an Urbanizing World," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 1, Fall 2002, pp. 123–145.

¹²⁴In April 2009, Nazim (Mayor) Syed Mustafa Kamal of Karachi was chosen the best mayor in Pakistan by the Canada Pakistan Friendship Association. Although the association is not unbiased, the award did reflect Kamal's efforts to improve public services.

Figure 2.3
Comparison of Growth Rates in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India



SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, various years.

RAND MG910-2.3

uct (GDP) in Pakistan rose 3.4 percent; in India, it was rising by 5.4 percent per year. Rapid growth in India has generated very tangible increases in incomes, especially for the rising Indian middle class. Pakistan's middle class has grown and enjoyed rapid growth in incomes, but the slower rate of growth has not lifted as many people out of poverty as in India and has not generated the same degree of economic dynamism.

Growth in Pakistan has been fairly solidly based. All sectors have contributed to growth, but increases in output in manufacturing, financial services, and government services have been especially strong. Like elsewhere in the developing world, the telecommunications industry has been an important driver; because of the spread of cell phones, the number of telephones (fixed line and mobile) per 100 people has jumped from 2 in 2000 to 25 in 2006. The penetration rates continue to rise. Through 2008, merchandise exports have been rising at an average annual rate of 12.0 percent per year, almost twice as fast as in India and faster than in Bangladesh. Exports have been an

important driver of growth in manufacturing. Remittances sent home by the many Pakistanis working abroad, primarily in the Persian Gulf, have also boosted growth. Remittances ran an estimated \$6 billion in 2007, about one-third of the value of exports. Agriculture, Pakistan's most important sector, has grown more slowly than GDP. Output of major crops has more or less kept pace with population growth, while livestock output has grown much more rapidly than the population.

In fall 2008, Pakistan experienced a balance-of-payments crisis. Part of the crisis was due to domestic factors: The Pakistani government had failed to improve its fiscal balance by reining in spending on subsidies and capital investment. Global economic conditions contributed heavily to Pakistan's problems. Sharp increases in global prices of food and petroleum products resulted in sharp increases in subsidies to cover the cost of government-controlled prices for food and for imported fuel. Higher expenditures on subsidies added to Pakistan's fiscal problems, while higher prices for oil resulted in large increases in Pakistan's import bill. The global financial panic made it impossible for Pakistan to finance its current account deficit. After searching for alternative solutions, Pakistan signed a Stand-By Agreement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund on November 24, 2008. Despite the continued deterioration in the global economy, Pakistan has generally adhered to its SBA, although the IMF and Pakistan agreed to relax the target for the budget deficit in 2009 when Pakistan failed to generate sufficient tax revenues to meet the target. The exchange rate has stabilized, but growth in GDP is projected to slow to 2.5 percent in 2009, according to the International Monetary Fund, and potentially 1 percent, according to the World Bank.¹²⁵

Inflation and Fiscal Balance

Until 2008, Pakistan was able to avoid extreme bouts of inflation through enforcement of reasonable monetary policy. After accelerating

¹²⁵International Monetary Fund, *Pakistan: 2009 Article IV Consultation and First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement—Staff Report*, Washington, D.C., IMF Country Report No. 09/123, April 2009, p. 30; the World Bank, *Global Development Finance: Charting a Global Recovery*, Washington, D.C., 2009, p. 137.

in the last few years of rapid growth, consumer price inflation surged to 25 percent in 2008 as commodity prices jumped.¹²⁶ The increases are due to the rising prices of food and oil. Inflation averaged 8 percent per year between 2003 and 2007. Inflation has eased as commodity prices have fallen but is still uncomfortably high, running 17.2 percent in March 2009.

Pakistan has had difficulty in maintaining its fiscal balance. Budget deficits have been running 4.3 percent of GDP, excluding external grants, and between 3.7 and 4.0 percent when grants are included. Foreign borrowing, privatization receipts, and high rates of domestic savings have made it possible for the Pakistani government to finance these deficits; money creation has also played an indirect role. In 2008, a sharp increase in subsidy payments to restrain increases in food and imported fuel prices resulted in a large increase in the budget deficit, which contributed to the balance-of-payments crisis in fall 2008.

A bigger problem than the size of the deficits has been the modest revenue base upon which government finances rest. Tax revenues as a share of GDP are just 11 percent of GDP. By way of comparison, India collects 18 percent of GDP in tax revenues. This 7 percent difference greatly affects government expenditures in Pakistan. The Pakistan government spends an average of 20 percent of GDP, of which the military takes 20 percent. The Indian government spends 28 percent of GDP, of which 10 percent goes to the military. Although neither the Pakistani nor the Indian governments are models of efficiency, revenue constraints in Pakistan have severely limited both public investment and expenditures on public services. Pakistan's very limited tax base increases its vulnerability to sharp shifts in revenues, from the domestic tax base or from donors or lenders abroad, or in expenditures, as was the case in 2008.

Employment, Income Growth, and Poverty

Employment growth has been strong in Pakistan in this decade, rising by 29 percent between 2000 and 2007, more than double the rate of

¹²⁶Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, *Monthly Review on Price Indices*, Islamabad/Karachi, Pakistan, August 2008a.

growth in the population (12 percent). In addition, large numbers of Pakistanis work outside of the country, especially in the Persian Gulf, which has provided additional employment opportunities, often for young Pashtun men from poor areas, such as FATA.

Strong economic growth and demand for labor in the Gulf resulted in a fall in the unemployment rate, from 7.8 percent in 2000 to 5.3 percent in 2006. However, significant regional variations in unemployment remain. The unemployment rate in NWFP is substantially higher than in Sindh or Punjab.¹²⁷ Typical of poorer countries, rural rates of unemployment are lower than urban rates, even though urban incomes are higher. Because of the lack of a social safety net, everyone in rural areas needs to find some sort of work. Higher incomes in urban areas make it possible for individuals to rely on family or friends while they extend their job search.

Pakistan's high fertility rates in the 1980s and 1990s and declining infant mortality rates have created a youth bulge: a disproportionately large share of the population is younger than 30. Pakistan's fast-growing, young population is one of the many reasons the country has been a source of concern. Domestic and international analysts often opine that young, unemployed men are susceptible to recruitment into militant groups despite the lack of support for this contention in the literature, which tends *not* to look at Pakistan.¹²⁸ Other studies *do*

¹²⁷SPDC, 2007, p. 166.

¹²⁸See Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?* Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9074, July 2002b; Alberto Abadie, *Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism*, Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 10859, October 2004; James Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2006, pp. 159–178; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 119–144; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" *The New Republic*, June 24, 2002a, pp. 27–33; Claude Berrebi, *Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians*, Princeton, N.J.: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, No. 477, 2003; Peter L. Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Scapegoat," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 117–125; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, pp. 61–98.

find that if the young population is gainfully employed, the chances that young people will participate in armed rebellion are significantly reduced.¹²⁹ For these reasons, the connections between poverty and unemployment on the one hand and supply of militant manpower on the other cannot be dismissed altogether in the case of Pakistan. If economic growth does not keep pace with the growth of the population, militant organizations may find it easier to recruit high-aptitude young men because the pool of “applicants” may be larger and the applicants may have better skills than those applicants in periods of greater economic growth. While economic growth need not bring about a complete cessation of militant labor supply, it can restrict the pool of better-qualified militants, thus reducing the quality of possible terror, if not the incidence.¹³⁰ The key to ensuring that Pakistan’s youth bulge does not have a destabilizing effect will, therefore, be to create conditions for more-rapid economic growth and to ensure that regional disparities that could create grounds for serious grievances are ameliorated.

Despite recent growth in per capita GDP, Pakistan remains a poor country: In 2008, per capita GDP was just \$887 at market exchange rates and \$2,700 at purchasing-power-parity exchange rates in 2005 dollars. Average wages were correspondingly low. Growth was not spread evenly: Urban areas have fared better than rural areas. Nationally, rural poverty rates have been over 60 percent higher than in urban areas. The situation in FATA is the most distressing. Per capita income there is half the national level; 60 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.¹³¹

Remittances from Pakistanis working abroad, especially in the Persian Gulf, reduce these disparities. Wages in the Gulf of just a few hundred dollars a month go a long way in Pakistan. In 2007, remit-

¹²⁹For a discussion, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2004, pp. 563–595.

¹³⁰See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “The Quality of Terror,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 515–530. For a discussion, see C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection,” *Asia Policy*, Vol. 4, July 2007, pp. 107–134.

¹³¹International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 9.

tances financed over 5 percent of household consumption expenditures, and much more in poor, rural areas.


Because food looms so large in household budgets, changes in the relative price of food as well as economic growth have a major impact on living standards for the vast majority of Pakistanis. Increases in oil and food prices in 2008, coupled with price controls on food, hit everyone hard, especially the urban poor. Shortages due to price controls and higher prices led to riots and demonstrations. Declines in commodity prices in the latter part of 2008 and during 2009 have helped, but if relative prices for food go back up, poor urban households will be the big losers.

Economic Outlook

What will Pakistan's economic future likely be? As noted above, Pakistan, along with many other developing countries, is undergoing a sharp adjustment in its balance of payments. Growth has slowed sharply, and the economy might even contract if agriculture does poorly in 2009. However, both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank project that growth will gradually accelerate in 2010 and 2011, eventually returning to the rates of the earlier part of this decade if levels of violence can be maintained and macro and microeconomic policies stay on course. On the whole, economic policies have been more sensible in this decade than in the 1990s. Pakistan has adhered to its SBA with the International Monetary Fund. The Zardari government appears intent on continuing the drive to liberalize and privatize. If Zardari refrains from exacerbating current levels of corruption, continues privatization, and keeps the budget under control, growth should resume, especially if remittances from the Persian Gulf resurge.

Figure 2.4 shows Pakistan's GDP through 2025 in 2008 dollars at market and purchasing-power-parity exchange rates, assuming economic growth follows the path projected by the World Bank and then grows at the same average rate as between 2000 and 2008, 5.4 percent per year. Under these assumption, by 2025 Pakistan's GDP at purchasing-power-parity exchange rates would run \$1 trillion (2008 dollars) and would be 2.2 times larger than in 2008. Between 2008 and 2025, per capita GDP would rise at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent

Figure 2.4
Growth in GDP in Pakistan Through 2025



SOURCE: RAND projections.

RAND MG910-2.4

and would be 80 percent higher in 2025 than in 2008. Under this scenario, households would enjoy solid gains in income, although Pakistan would remain a lower-income developing country in 2025, with a per capita GDP of \$4,600 per year at purchasing-power-parity exchange rates. The disparity between the size of Pakistan’s and India’s economies would continue to widen. Pakistan would be unable to maintain defense spending at anywhere near India’s levels.

Social Development

For good and ill, trends in population growth, education, and health care will play important roles in determining political stability and political outcomes in Pakistan. Many indicators of social development in Pakistan are low, even compared with other low-income countries. It ranks 137th on the United Nation’s Human Development Scale, well below Indonesia, another poor Muslim nation, which comes in at

107th.¹³² Pakistan scores poorly in terms of infant mortality, literacy, female enrollment in schools, and access to public health care, to name just a few indicators. The weaknesses of Pakistan's government in providing public services have contributed to slower progress in these areas than in Indonesia or India.

To compound the general problem of poor government services, access to and quality of services varies dramatically across the country. Excluding FATA, Sindh and Baluchistan tend to score lowest in terms of social development.¹³³ Infant mortality is much higher in Baluchistan than in Punjab. Youth literacy is six times higher in some districts in Pakistan than in others. Immunization coverage has expanded in some provinces, while stagnating or even declining in others.

Education

Pakistan's educational system functions poorly. Although Pakistan and India had comparable levels of literacy at partition, Pakistan now lags significantly behind India. In 2006, the literacy rate was 49.9 percent, compared with the regional average of 59.6 percent and the Indian rate of 61 percent, although in both instances statistics are of doubtful quality.¹³⁴ According to official statistics, literacy rates have been rising; the rate was only 42.9 percent in 2000.

Within Pakistan itself, there are significant variations between literacy rates for males and females, between rural and urban areas, and between provinces. Female literacy has been rising, but it is significantly lower than the rates for males.¹³⁵ According to official Pakistani

¹³²India's Muslim population was 138 million according to the 2001 census; Indonesia's population in 2005 was 226 million, roughly 88 percent of which were Muslims (Census of India, *Census 2001*, "India at a Glance, Religious Composition," New Delhi, India: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, not dated).

¹³³The World Bank, *Attaining the Millennium Development Goals in Pakistan*, Washington, D.C., Discussion Paper Series, No. 37839, May 1, 2005b, p. iii.

¹³⁴The World Bank, *Education Statistics Version 5.3*, Washington, D.C., 2005a.

¹³⁵The male literacy rate is 65 percent, compared with a 40 percent rate for females (SPDC, 2007, p. 152). See also Masooda Bano, *Pakistan Country Case Study*, Paris, France: United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization, 2008/ED/EFA/MRT/PI/11, 2007, p. 14.

figures, in 2007, the female literacy rate was 42.4 percent, and the male rate 67 percent.¹³⁶ Similarly, while the mean number of years spent in school has increased for both sexes, females on average spend less than half as much time in school as males.¹³⁷ Literacy is much higher in Punjab and Sindh than in NWFP or Baluchistan.¹³⁸ The divergence between male and female literacy rates is also noticeably greater in Baluchistan and NWFP than elsewhere in the country. Overall, literacy rates are even lower in FATA, where very few women can read.¹³⁹

In response to the poor state of public education (in which the vast majority of students are enrolled), parents have increasingly enrolled their children in private education. Children from wealthier families not only receive a much better education and have correspondingly better economic prospects, they are imbued with a different cultural worldview than the children who pass through the public educational system.¹⁴⁰

Poorer families will sometimes send their sons to Pakistan's Islamic seminaries, or madaris. Education in Pakistan has received substantial attention in Western discussions of Pakistan's future on account of the madaris, which have sometimes been portrayed as hotbeds of Islamic radicalism. Recent research has shown that the madaris are neither as prevalent nor as universally involved in militant recruitment as previously believed. Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, but studies have found that less than 1 percent of all full-time students

¹³⁶Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, *Labour Force Survey: 2007–2008, Twenty Seventh Issue*, Islamabad, Pakistan, December 2008b.

¹³⁷Males spend an average of 8.2 years in school, versus an average of 3.4 years for females (SPDC, 2007).

¹³⁸SPDC, 2007, p. 118.

¹³⁹International Crisis Group, 2006, p. 9.

¹⁴⁰On this subject see Shahid Javed Burki, "Educating the Pakistani Masses: The World Needs to Help," Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the Hearing Combating Terrorism Through Education: The Near East & South Asian Experience, Washington, D.C., April 19, 2005.

are enrolled in madaris.¹⁴¹ The belief that the majority of madaris are training grounds for terrorists is also without basis in fact.¹⁴² However, some research has shown that those educated in the madaris tend to support violence more readily than do those educated elsewhere. This fact does not necessarily mean that madaris propagate militant ideologies; parents with such views may choose to send their children to madaris. Madaris may reflect the entrenched pro-militancy views of a particular segment of the population rather than being the source of those views. This said, a number of scholars have expressed particular concern about the content of educational curricula in the madaris. Government-issued textbooks in the public schools have also drawn criticism for encouraging intolerance.

Health

Infant mortality is a key indicator of the overall health of a country. Pakistan's infant mortality rates are high: 79 deaths per thousand births in 2005, compared with India's rate of 56 and Bangladesh's rate of 54. This figure is down from 85 deaths per thousand births in the 1990s in Pakistan.¹⁴³ Infant mortality is much higher in rural areas than in urban areas and in some regions than others. The number of births in medical institutions in Baluchistan is less than half the national average, a fact that is reflected in higher rates of infant mortality. Infant mortality is likely to continue to decline, but the extent of the decline will depend on how rapidly sanitation improves, the extent of expansion of female schooling, and especially the expansion of immunization.¹⁴⁴

Preventable disease is still a major cause of death in Pakistan. While the 1990s saw progress on eradicating polio and controlling tuberculosis, routine immunization rates remained substandard, espe-

¹⁴¹C. Christine Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007a, p. 95.

¹⁴²Fair, 2007a.

¹⁴³UNDP, *Indicators—2007/2008 Report*, New York: Human Development Report Office, 2007/2008b.

¹⁴⁴The World Bank, 2005, pp. 15–17.

cially in rural areas.¹⁴⁵ Immunization rates also vary across provinces, with Baluchistan significantly below the national average.¹⁴⁶ Disease is in part the result of the lack of access to clean water and sanitation. Again there are significant variations between rural and urban areas as well as across provinces, with access to clean water in Punjab significantly below the national average, though improving.¹⁴⁷ Such low levels of health have repercussions on economic productivity and poverty levels. As the World Bank puts it, parts of Pakistan are caught in a “vicious cycle of illness, low productivity, and poverty.”¹⁴⁸

Concluding Remarks

A stable Pakistan at peace with itself and with its neighbors is a necessary precondition for security throughout South Asia. Yet, this chapter has argued that because of Pakistan’s troublesome past, structural problems run deep. A lack of consensus among elites, especially the military leadership and civilians, over how and who is to wield power, the use of militants to pursue foreign policy and security goals, high illiteracy rates, and poor health care combine to cloud Pakistan’s future. The continued influx of poor and poorly educated young men into the labor force may well create a cohort that is ripe for radicalization.¹⁴⁹ Wide disparities in income and development and the weaknesses of Pakistan’s educational and health systems will continue to contribute to political instability.

¹⁴⁵The World Bank, *Improving Human Development Outcomes in Pakistan*, Washington, D.C., a Background Note Prepared by the World Bank for the Pakistan Human Development Forum (January 24–26, 2002), Islamabad, No. 29940, January 2002, pp. 3–4.

¹⁴⁶Rates in Baluchistan were reported at 48 percent in 2005–2006, as compared with a national average of 71 percent. See SPDC, 2007, p. 160.

¹⁴⁷The rate of access was 27 percent in Punjab with a national average of 34 percent in 2005–2006 (SPDC, 2007, p. 161). The same data show that access is significantly lower for females in all regions except NWFP, which has the highest overall rates.

¹⁴⁸The World Bank, *Pakistan Public Expenditure Management: Strategic Issues and Reform Agenda, Vol. I*, Washington, D.C., Report No. 25665-PK, January 28, 2004, p. 13.

¹⁴⁹Cohen, 2004, pp. 233–235.

On the other hand, the rate of growth in population has slowed dramatically, down from over 3 percent in the 1980s to less than 2 percent per year. Pakistanis are becoming better educated. According to Pakistani statistics, literacy rates have been rising. Economic growth accelerated between 2000 and 2008, in part because of more-enlightened economic policies, as the Pakistani government has haltingly liberalized the economy and privatized state-owned enterprises. Employment grew substantially before the recent balance-of-payments crisis. The Persian Gulf provided an outlet for poorer, less well-educated Pakistani laborers to find work. Remittances boosted living standards sharply in the home districts of these expatriate workers.

Political and policy decisions by Pakistani elites will be key to determining whether Pakistan can break out of the patterns of the past. In the next chapter, we examine the ability of Pakistani institutions to make and implement decisions that could put Pakistan on course for a brighter future.

